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Detention of American Citizens as Enemy Combatants
Summary
This report, which will be updated as necessary, analyzes the authority to detain
American citizens who are suspected of being members, agents, or associates of Al
Qaeda, the Taliban and possibly other terrorist organizations as “enemy combatants.”
The Department of Justice cites two World War II era cases, Ex parte Quirin and In
re Territo, to support its contention that the President may order that certain U.S.
citizens as well as non-citizens be held as enemy combatants pursuant to the law of
war and Article II of the Constitution.  Critics, however, question the assertion of
executive authority to detain U.S. citizens, without ordinary due process of law, in
order to prevent terrorist acts or gather intelligence; and some argue that Congress
has prohibited such detention of U.S. citizens when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
While the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed with the Bush Administration
that Congress authorized such detentions in its authorization for the President to use
force against those he determines are responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks
on the United States, the Second Circuit recently held that Congress has not
authorized such detentions. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in both cases
and will hear them together on April 28, 2004.
This report provides background information regarding the cases of two U.S.
citizens who are currently in military custody as “enemy combatants,” Yaser Esam
Hamdi and Jose Padilla. A brief introduction to the law of war pertinent to the
detention of different categories of individuals is offered, followed by  brief analyses
of the main legal precedents invoked to support the President’s actions, as well as Ex
parte Milligan, which some argue supports the opposite conclusion.  A discussion
of U.S. practice during wartime to detain persons deemed dangerous to the national
security follows, including legislative history that may help to shed light on
Congress’ intent in authorizing the use of force to fight terrorism. 
The report provides brief synopses of the facts and the present disposition of the
two above-mentioned cases.  Because Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan during
active hostilities, there may be a presumption that he is an enemy combatant and that
his detention is similar to the traditional treatment of prisoners of war (POW),
although he has not been determined to qualify for POW status. The case of Padilla,
however, appears to raise additional legal questions, because the allegations against
him would seem to place him in the category of persons traditionally treated as alien
enemies rather than enemy soldiers. 
The report addresses the constitutional and statutory sources that arguably
provide authority for the detention of enemy combatants, as well as those that may
prevent the exercise of that power with respect to U.S. citizens.  The report concludes
that historically, even during declared wars, additional statutory authority has been
seen as necessary to validate the detention of citizens not members of any armed
forces, casting in some doubt the argument that the power to detain is necessarily
implied by an authorization to use force.  Finally, the report briefly analyzes the
Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 1029, which would authorize the
President to detain U.S. citizens and residents who are determined to be “enemy
combatants” in certain circumstances.
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1 The term “enemy combatant” is not well-defined.  See Gary Solis, Even a “Bad” Man has
Rights, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002, at A19 (pointing out that it stems from the Supreme
Court case Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)). Under the law of war, enemy combatants
may be targeted by the military or detained as a wartime preventive measure.  See generally
Treatment of ‘Battlefield Detainees’ in the War on Terrorism, CRS Report  RL31367.  With
respect to the current conflict, the term has been variously defined by government officials
to be a person with some association with terrorist organizations, but so far it appears to
have been applied in a more limited way to cover only those suspected of some involvement
with the Taliban or Al Qaeda.  The Department of Defense defines “enemy combatant” as
“an individual who, under the laws and customs of war, may be detained for the duration of
an armed conflict.”  See Letter from William J. Haynes II to Senator Carl Levin (November
26, 2002), available at [http://www.nimj.com/documents/dodletter.pdf]. In the current
conflict, according to the letter, the term includes a member, agent, or associate of Al Qaeda
or the Taliban.  See id.
See also Anthony Dworkin, Law and the Campaign Against Terrorism: The View from the
Pentagon, Crimes of War Project, December 16, 2002 available at
[http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-pentagon.html] (interview with Charles Allen,
Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs at the Department of Defense)(DoD
official defining “enemy combatants” in the war on terrorism as “those who are a part of that
enterprise [Al Qaeda and other global terrorist organizations] and/or threaten the United
States,” including any “member, agent or associate of Al Qaeda or the Taliban”). 
We have not found a precise military definition for the term “enemy combatant.”  The
Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) defines  “enemy” to include:
organized forces of the enemy in time of war, any hostile body that our forces
may be opposing, such as a rebellious mob or a band of renegades, and ...
civilians as well as members of military organizations.  “Enemy” is not restricted
to the enemy government or its armed forces. All the citizens of one belligerent
are enemies of the government and all the citizens of the other.
MCM IV-34.  See also discussion of the meaning of combatant, infra note 25.
Detention of American Citizens as 
Enemy Combatants
This report analyzes the authority to detain American citizens who are suspected
of being members, agents, or associates of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or other terrorist
organizations as “enemy combatants.”1  The Department of Justice cites primarily
two World War II era cases to support its contention that the President may order that
certain American citizens as well as non-citizens be held as enemy combatants. 
Critics, however, note that an American citizen is not triable by military commission
under the President’s Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001 (M.O.), and question whether
a U.S. citizen may constitutionally be detained indefinitely under military custody
without being charged.  It has also been argued that the President’s actions are
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2 See ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, Revised Report 109 (Feb. 10,
2003) available at [http://www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations03/109.pdf].
3 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
4 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’g in part 233 F.Supp.2d
564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d on reh’g 243 F.Supp.2d 42 (2003).
5 See Tom Brune and Craig Gordon, American Arrested in “Dirty bomb” Plot, NEWSDAY,
June 11, 2002, at A5.
6 See Press Release, Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes II, DoD
Responds to ABA Enemy Combatant Report, (Oct. 2, 2002), available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2002/b10022002_bt497-02.html].  
7 A public defender was appointed to represent Padilla while he was detained as a material
witness, pursuant to the Material Witness Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144.  The judge determined
that this relationship is sufficient to qualify her as “next friend” of Padilla, with standing to
pursue a petition for writ of habeas corpus on his behalf. 233 F.Supp.2d at 578. 
foreclosed by 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which provides that no U.S. citizen may be
detained except pursuant to an act of Congress.2  While the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals has agreed with the Bush Administration that Congress authorized such
detentions in its authorization for the President to use force against those he
determines are responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States,3
the Second Circuit found otherwise, at least with respect to citizens captured on U.S.
soil in non-combat circumstances.4  The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
both cases.  The central issues to be argued are whether the President has an inherent
authority during war to detain persons, and if congressional authorization is needed
to exercise such a power, whether Congress has in fact authorized the detentions.
The report also briefly analyzes the Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 1029,
which would authorize the President to detain U.S. citizens and residents who are
determined to be “enemy combatants” in certain circumstances.
Background
The Attorney General announced on June 10, 2002, that an American citizen,
Jose Padilla, also known as Abdullah Muhajir, was arrested May 8, 2002 upon his
return from Pakistan, allegedly with the intent of participating in a plot to use a
radiological bomb against unknown targets within the United States.  Padilla was
detained under a court order as a material witness until the Department of Justice
faced a court deadline to either bring charges or release him.  After prosecutors
reportedly either lacked the physical evidence or were unwilling to disclose classified
evidence necessary to bring charges against Padilla, President Bush signed an
unspecified order declaring him to be an “enemy combatant,” and transferred him to
the custody of the Department of Defense.5  The Administration has taken the
position that the law of war allows the United States to detain indefinitely members,
agents or associates of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, without charging
them with a crime under either criminal statutes or the international law of war,
notwithstanding their American citizenship.6  The Administration has also denied
Padilla access to his attorney,7 arguing that he has no constitutional right to an
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8 The Administration takes the position that
in the case of citizens who take up arms against America, any interest those individuals
might have in obtaining the assistance of counsel for the purpose of preparing a habeas
petition must give way to the national security needs of this country to gather intelligence
from captured enemy combatants. Although the right to counsel is a fundamental part of
our criminal justice system, it is undeniably foreign to the law of war. Imagine the burden
on our ability to wage war if those trying to kill our soldiers and civilians were given the
opportunity to ‘lawyer up’ when they are captured. Respectfully, those who urge the
extension of the right to counsel to these combatants, for the purpose of filing a habeas
petition, confuse the context of war with that of the criminal justice system.
See Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks to the American Bar Association Standing Committee
on Law and National  Securi ty (Feb.  24,  2004) ,  avai lable  at
[http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/judge_gonzales.pdf]. 
9 233 F.Supp.2d at 605.
10 243 F.Supp.2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’g on reh’g 233 F.Supp.2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
11 256 F.Supp.2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
12 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
13 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, cert. granted (U.S. Feb. 20, 2004) (No. 03-1027).
14  The first American citizen caught up in the war on terrorism, John Walker Lindh, who
was captured in Afghanistan, was charged in federal district court with conspiring to kill
Americans. He asserted the defense of combat immunity, which the government argued is
not possible given the fact that President Bush has declared that no member of the Taliban
can qualify as a lawful combatant  See United States v. John Walker Lindh, Criminal No.
02-37-A (E.D. Va.), Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count One
of the Indictment for Failure to State a Violation of the Charging Statute (Combat
Immunity)(#2). The defendant ultimately agreed to plead guilty to a charge of supplying
services to the Taliban, in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), and carrying an explosive
during the commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2); the government
dropped the conspiracy charge. The United States further agreed 
(continued...)
attorney because he has not been charged with a crime.8  After a federal judge ruled
that Padilla has a right to challenge his detention and the concomitant right to consult
with an attorney,9 the  government moved for a reconsideration of the order based on
its assertion that no conditions were possible that would permit Padilla to
communicate with his lawyer without endangering national security, which the judge
considered but rejected.10  The judge certified the case for interlocutory appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, including the issue of the President to
order Padilla’s detention as an enemy combatant.11  The Second Circuit held that the
President does not have the inherent authority, nor has Congress authorized him to
declare U.S. citizens captured on U.S. territory in non-combat circumstances to be
enemy combatants and place them under military jurisdiction.12  The court gave the
government 30 days within which to charge Padilla with a crime, arrest him on
another material witness warrant, or release him.  The government sought and
received a stay in order to petition for certiorari on an expedited basis, which also
was granted.13  The government also granted Padilla a limited right to meet with his
attorney under government monitoring.
One other American citizen is known to be detained without charges as an
“enemy combatant.”14  Yaser Eser Hamdi, captured in Afghanistan, was detained at
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14 (...continued)
to forego any right it has to treat the defendant as an unlawful enemy combatant
based on the conduct alleged in the Indictment ... [unless the government later]
determine[s] that the defendant has engaged in conduct proscribed by the
offenses now listed at 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), or conduct now proscribed
under 50 U.S.C. § 1705, [in which case the plea] agreement ... shall be null and
void, and the United States may immediately invoke any right it has at that time
to capture and detain the defendant as an unlawful enemy combatant based on the
conduct alleged in the Indictment.
See United States v. John Walker Lindh, Criminal No. 02-37-A (E.D. Va.), Plea Agreement
at paragraph 21.  Neither 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (defining federal crime of terrorism)
nor 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (providing criminal penalty for violation of any license, order, or
regulation issued by the President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA)) makes mention of the possibility that offenders may be declared to
be “enemy combatants.”
15 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 02-6895 (4th Cir.) Government Brief on Appeal of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, available at
[http://news.findlaw.com/ hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums61902gbrf.pdf](appealing the order
to provide the federal public defender with unmonitored access to the detainee).
16 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, reh’g denied 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004)(No. 03-6696).  
17 See Press Release, Department of Defense, DoD Announces Detainee Allowed Access to
Lawyer (Dec. 2, 2003), available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/
nr20031202-0717.html].
18 See id.
the U.S. Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba with other detainees captured in
Afghanistan and other countries, until it was discovered that he was born in Baton
Rouge and thus had a colorable claim to U.S. citizenship.  He was then transferred
to a high-security naval brig in South Carolina, where he continues to be held in
military custody without criminal charge.  An attorney filed a petition for habeas
corpus on his behalf.  The government asserts it has the unreviewable prerogative to
detain him without trial and without providing him access to an attorney, as a
necessary exercise of the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief to provide for
national security and defense.15  The Fourth Circuit largely agreed with the
government’s position, reversing two orders issued by the district court and ordering
the case dismissed.16  After the Fourth Circuit denied the petitioner’s request for a
rehearing en banc, Hamdi’s attorney filed a petition for certiorari at  the Supreme
Court, which was granted.  The government recently announced that, the
interrogation of Hamdi having been completed, he is now permitted to have access
to his attorney, subject to security precautions.17  The Pentagon emphasizes that
“allowing Hamdi access to counsel as a matter of discretion and military policy; such
access is not required by domestic or international law and should not be treated as
a precedent.”18
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19 The White House has stated it uses a more strenuous legal process for determining who
among U.S. citizens arrested within the United States meets the legal definition to be
designated an “enemy combatant.”  See Gonzales, supra note  ?. While noting that no
specific procedure is required by law,  White House Counsel Gonzales described the
procedure as follows:
In any case where it appears that a U.S. citizen captured within the United States may be
an al Qaeda operative and thus may qualify as an enemy combatant, information on the
individual is developed and numerous options are considered by the various relevant
agencies (the Department of Defense, CIA and DOJ), including the potential for a
criminal prosecution, detention as a material witness, and detention as an enemy
combatant. Options often are narrowed by the type of information available, and the best
course of action in a given case may be influenced by numerous factors including the
assessment of the individual’s threat potential and value as a possible intelligence source.
. . .  When it appears that criminal prosecution and detention as a material witness are, on
balance, less-than-ideal options as long-term solutions to the situation, we may initiate
some type of informal process to present to the appropriate decision makers the question
whether an individual might qualify for designation as an enemy combatant. But even this
work is not actually commenced unless the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of
Justice has tentatively advised, based on oral briefings, that the individual meets the legal
standard for enemy combatant status. . . .
20 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
21 See DoD Press Release, supra note 6 (“Article II of the Constitution is the primary basis
for the President’s authority to detain enemy combatants”).
22 Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUF”), P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
23 See THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 65 (Dieter Fleck, ed.
1995)(hereinafter “HANDBOOK”).
24 See id.
These two cases are distinguishable because the government reportedly captured
Hamdi on the battlefield, possibly creating a presumption that he is a combatant19.
Unlike Padilla, Hamdi is not alleged to have committed specific acts which would
violate the law of war if committed by a lawful soldier.  Padilla, even if he were a
legitimate enemy combatant, would not likely be entitled to combat immunity for his
alleged involvement in an enemy plot to commit acts of terrorism on American soil.20
In both cases, the Government invokes its authority under the international law of
war, and the President’s authority as Commander-In-Chief, to justify the detention.21
If authorization from Congress is necessary, the Administration argues, such
authorization can be found in the Authorization to Use Force (“AUF”)22 and other
statutes.
Status and Detention of Persons in War
The law of war divides persons in the midst of an armed conflict into two broad
categories: combatants and civilians.23  This fundamental distinction determines the
international legal status of persons participating in or affected by combat, and
determines the legal protections afforded to such persons as well as the legal
consequences of their conduct.24  Combatants are those persons who are authorized
by international law to fight in accordance with the law of war on behalf of a party
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25 See id. at 67. See also OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, chapter 2 (2002) available at
[http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf].
(Lawful combatants have valid combatant status and receive law of war protection;
however, others who participate in combat, without valid combatant status, may be treated
as criminals under domestic law.) Id.  Members of an organized armed force, group or unit
who are not medical or religious personnel are combatants.  Id.  Combatants are lawful
targets during combat operations.  Prisoners of war are considered noncombatants and must
be protected by the Detaining Power. See id.  The term “enemy combatant” appears most
frequently in the context of military rules of engagement, which stress that only enemy
combatants may lawfully be attacked during military operations.  
26 See The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317 (hereinafter “GPW”).  GPW art. 21 states:
The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on
them the obligation of not leaving, beyond certain limits, the camp where they are
interned, or if the said camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter. Subject
to the provisions of the present Convention relative to penal and disciplinary
sanctions, prisoners of war may not be held in close confinement except where
necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the continuation of the
circumstances which make such confinement necessary. 
27  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter “GC”]. GC art. 42 states:
The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be
ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.
28 See GPW, supra note 26, art. 21. 
to the conflict.25  Civilians are not authorized to fight, but are protected from
deliberate targeting by combatants as long as they do not take up arms.  In order to
protect civilians, the law of war requires combatants to conduct military operations
in a manner designed to minimize civilian casualties and to limit the amount of
damage and suffering to that which can be justified by military necessity.  To limit
exposure of civilians to military attacks, combatants are required, as a general rule,
to distinguish themselves from civilians.  Combatants who fail to distinguish
themselves from civilians run the risk of being denied the privilege to be treated as
prisoners of war if captured by the enemy.
The treatment of all persons who fall into the hands of the enemy during an
international armed conflict depends upon the status of the person as determined
under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.  Under these conventions, parties to an
armed conflict have the right to capture and intern enemy soldiers26 as well as
civilians who pose a danger to the security of the state,27 at least for the duration of
hostilities.28  The right to detain enemy combatants is not based on the supposition
that the prisoner is “guilty” as an enemy for any crimes against the Detaining Power,
either as an individual or as an agent of the opposing state.  POWs are detained for
security purposes, to remove those soldiers as a threat from the battlefield. The law
of war encourages capture and detention of enemy combatants as a more humane
alternative to accomplish the same purpose by wounding or killing them. 
Enemy civilians may be interned for similar reasons, although the law of war
does not permit them to be treated as lawful military targets.  As citizens of an enemy
country, they may be presumed to owe allegiance to the enemy.  The law of war
CRS-7
29 50 U.S.C. § 21 (defining “enemy” as “all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the
hostile nation or government, being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be
within the United States and not actually naturalized”).  
30 See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (upholding President’s authority to order
the removal of all alien enemies “who shall be deemed by the Attorney General to be
dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States”).  The Supreme Court
declined to review the determination by the Alien Enemy Hearing Board that the petitioner
was dangerous, and noted that no question as to the validity of the administrative hearings
had been raised.  Id. at 163, n.4.  However, the Court also noted that an enemy alien
restrained pursuant to the Act did have access to the courts to challenge whether the
statutory criteria were met, in other words, whether a “declared war” existed and whether
the person restrained is in fact an enemy alien fourteen years or older. Id. at 170-72, n.17.
31 Internees may challenge their detention in court.  See id.  
32 See generally Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, CRS Report
RL31367.   The question appears to turn on whether the label “unlawful combatant” may
be applied  across the board to all members of a belligerent group, or whether it applies only
on an individual basis to those who participate unlawfully in combat. It would seem that
denying belligerent status to all members of a group amounts to denying the group as a
whole belligerent status, in which case it would not be possible to engage in armed conflict
with it.  As one observer comments: 
According to their terms, the Geneva Conventions apply symmetrically — that
is to say, they are either applicable to both sides in a conflict, or to neither.
Therefore the White House statement that the Geneva Conventions do not extend
to Al Qaeda is effectively a declaration that the entire military campaign against
terrorism is not covered by the Geneva Conventions. 
See Dworkin, supra note 1.
33 See DOD Press Release, supra note 6 (“The purposes of detaining enemy combatants
during wartime are, among other things, to gather intelligence and to ensure that detainees
(continued...)
traditionally allowed for their internment and the confiscation of their property, not
because they are suspected of having committed a crime or even of harboring ill will
toward the host or occupying power; but rather, they are held in order to prevent their
acting on behalf of the enemy and to deprive the enemy of resources it might use in
its war efforts. Congress has delegated to the President the authority, during a
declared war or by proclamation, to provide for the restriction, internment or removal
of enemy aliens deemed dangerous.29  The Supreme Court has upheld internment
programs promulgated under the Alien Enemy Act.30  This form of detention, like the
detention of POWs, is administrative rather than punitive, and thus no criminal trial
is required.31  
The Detaining Power may punish enemy soldiers and civilians for crimes
committed prior to their capture as well as during captivity, but only after a fair trial
in accordance with the relevant convention and other applicable international law.
However, it is unclear whether a person who is neither a POW nor an enemy alien
may be detained without criminal charges,32 and if such detention is lawful, what
process is due the detainee under the Constitution or international law.  The
conditions of detention may also give rise to the question of whether they amount to
punishment, in this case, notwithstanding DoD’s recognition that the purpose for
detaining “enemy combatants” is not punitive in nature.33
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33 (...continued)
do not return to assist the enemy.... Then, as now, the purpose of detention was not to
punish, but to protect.”)
34  Proclamation No. 2561, of July 2, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101, 56 Stat. 1964.
35 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1942) (finding authority for military commissions
in the Articles of War, codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (1940).
36 See id. at 37-38 (“Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy
government, and with its aid,  guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts
are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”);
see also Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956) (“[T]he petitioner’s
citizenship in the United States does not ... confer upon him any constitutional rights not
accorded any other belligerent under the laws of war.”), cert. denied 352 U.S. 1014 (1957).
U.S. Precedent for Detention of Citizens
 as Enemy Combatants
The Department of Justice cites primarily two cases to support its contention
that the Constitution permits the detention without criminal charge of American
citizens under certain circumstances.  The government argues that the 1942 Supreme
Court decision in Ex parte Quirin (the German saboteurs case) and the 9th Circuit
case In re Territo, read together, permit the government to hold American citizens
as “enemy combatants,” regardless of their membership in any legitimate military
organization.  Others, however, distinguish those cases as dealing with occurrences
during a war declared by Congress and involving members of the armed forces of
hostile enemy states, and further argue that the Civil War case Ex parte Milligan
forecloses this theory.
Ex Parte Quirin.
After eight Nazi saboteurs were caught by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the President issued a proclamation declaring that “the safety of the United
States demands that all enemies who have entered upon the territory of the United
States as part of an invasion or predatory incursion, or who have entered in order to
commit sabotage, espionage or other hostile or warlike acts, should be promptly tried
in accordance with the law of war.”34  The eight German saboteurs (one of whom
claimed U.S. citizenship) were tried by military commission for entering the United
States by submarine, shedding their military uniforms, and conspiring to use
explosives on certain war industries and war utilities.  In the case of Ex parte Quirin,
the Supreme Court denied their writs of habeas corpus (although upholding their
right to petition for the writ, despite language in the Presidential proclamation
purporting to bar judicial review), holding that trial by such a commission did not
offend the Constitution and was authorized by statute.35  It also found the citizenship
of the saboteurs irrelevant to the determination of whether the saboteurs were “enemy
belligerents” within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.36  
CRS-9
37  Similar language is now part of the UCMJ.  See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (providing jurisdiction
for courts-martial does not deprive military commissions of concurrent jurisdiction in
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38 317 U.S. at 22-23 (citing Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101(1942)).
39 At oral argument before the Supreme Court, Attorney General Biddle suggested that had
the prisoners been captured by the military rather than arrested by the FBI, the military
could have detained them “in any way they wanted,” without any arraignment or any sort
of legal proceeding.  See 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 597 (Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, eds. 1975). 
40 317 U.S. at 30-31 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
41 Combatants are bound by all of the laws of war regulating conduct during combat, while
civilians are not really combatants at all, and are thus prohibited from participating in
combat, regardless of whether they follow generally applicable combat rules. See generally
CRS Report RL31367.  
42 See supra note 36.
To reach its decision, the Court applied the international common law of war,
as Congress had incorporated it by reference through Article 15 of the Articles of
War,37 and the President’s proclamation that 
[A]ll persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the
United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such
nation,and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States ...
through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or
attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts,
or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals.38 
Whether the accused could have been detained as “enemy combatants” without
any intent to try them before a military tribunal was not a question before the Court,39
but the Court suggested the possibility.  It stated:  
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between
the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also
between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are
subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces.
Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in
addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts
which render their belligerency unlawful.40
In its discussion of the status of “unlawful combatant,” the Court did not
distinguish between enemy soldiers who forfeit the right to be treated as prisoners of
war by failing to distinguish themselves as belligerents, as the petitioners had done,
and civilians who commit hostile acts during war without having the right to
participate in combat.  Both types of individuals may be called “unlawful
combatants,” yet the circumstances that give rise to their status differ in ways that
may be legally significant.41  However, the Court did recognize that the petitioners
fit into the first category,42 and expressly limited its opinion to the facts of the case:
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44 H.Rept. 78-219 (1943) (describing Justice Department proposal introduced in previous
Congress as H.R. 7737, then under consideration as amended in H.R. 2087).  The War
Security Act would have provided punishment for a list of “hostile acts against the United
States” if committed with the intent to aid a country with which the United States was at
war, to include sabotage, espionage, harboring or concealing an agent or member of the
armed forces of an enemy state, or entering or leaving the United States with the intent of
providing aid to the enemy.  It also would have made it a criminal offense to fail to report
information giving rise to probable cause to believe that another has committed, is
committing or plans to commit a hostile act against the United States. Id. at 11.  Title II of
the Act would have modified court procedure in cases involving these “hostile acts”as well
as certain other statutes, that would have allowed the Attorney General to certify the
importance of a case to the war effort, resulting in expedited proceedings, enhanced secrecy
for such proceedings, and a requirement for the approval of a federal judge to release the
accused on bail.  The Act was not intended to affect the jurisdiction of military tribunals and
did not cover uniformed members of the enemy acting in accordance with the law of war.
Id. at 12.
45 See id. at 1-2 (letter from Attorney General to the House of Representatives dated October
17, 1942).
46 See id. at 5 (stating that the maximum criminal punishment for a conspiracy to commit
sabotage would have been only two years).
We have no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries
of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war.
It is enough that petitioners here, upon the conceded facts, were plainly within
those boundaries, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission,
charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials
and utilities, entered or after entry remained in our territory without uniform —
an offense against the law of war. We hold only that those particular acts
constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to
be tried by military commission.43 
After the Quirin decision, the Attorney General asked Congress to pass
legislation to strengthen criminal law relating to internal security during wartime.44
Attorney General Biddle wrote that new law was necessary to cover serious gaps and
inadequacies in criminal law, which he argued did not provide sufficient punishment
for hostile enemy acts perpetrated on the territory of the United States.45  The House
Committee on the Judiciary endorsed the proposed War Security Act, pointing to the
fact that it had been necessary to try the eight Nazi saboteurs by military commission
due to the inadequacy of the penal code to punish the accused for acts that had not
yet been carried out.46  It also suggested that military jurisdiction might be
unavailable to try enemy saboteurs who had not “landed as part of a small invasion
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debate of the proposed act in the House of Representatives.  Supporters and detractors of
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come “wearing German uniforms” and thus were “subject to be prosecuted under military
law.” See 89 Cong. Rec. 2780 - 82 (1943) (remarks by Reps. Michener, Rankin, and
Kefauver). There does not appear to be any suggestion that Quirin could be interpreted to
authorize the detention without trial of individuals suspected of hostile intent by designating
them to be unlawful enemy combatants.
48 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).
49 Id. at 145.  
50 Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted).
51 Id. (citing Lamar’s Executor v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187, 194 (1875)).
52 Id. (citing WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONST., 340-42 (1862)).
bent upon acts of illegal hostilities.”47 The bill passed in the House of
Representatives, but was not subsequently taken up in the Senate.
In Re Territo.
In the case In re Territo,48 an American citizen who had been inducted into the
Italian army was captured during battle in Italy and transferred to a detention center
for prisoners of war in the United States.  He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
arguing that his U.S. citizenship foreclosed his being held as a POW.  The court
disagreed, finding that citizenship does not necessarily “affect[] the status of one
captured on the field of battle.”49  The court stated:
Those who have written texts upon the subject of prisoners of war agree that all
persons who are active in opposing an army in war may be captured and except
for spies and other non-uniformed plotters and actors for the enemy are prisoners
of war. 50
The petitioner argued that the Geneva Convention did not apply in cases such
as his. The court found no authority in support of that contention, noting that “[i]n
war, all residents of the enemy country are enemies.”51  The court also cited
approvingly the following passage:
A neutral, or a citizen of the United States, domiciled in the enemy country, not
only in respect to his property but also as to his capacity to sue, is deemed as
much an alien enemy as a person actually born under the allegiance and residing
within the dominions of the hostile nation.52 
While recognizing that Quirin was not directly in point, it found the discussion of
U.S. citizenship to be “indicative of the proper conclusion”:
Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy
government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on
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54 Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.  Article 1 states:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps, fulfilling the following conditions: 
To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
To carry arms openly; and 
To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it,
they are included under the denomination “army.” 
55 In that regard, cf. Ex parte Toscano, 208 F. 938 (S.D. Cal. 1913) (applying Hague
Convention to authorize holding of Mexican federalist troops, who had crossed the border
into the United States and surrendered to U.S. forces, as prisoners of war although the
United States was neutral in the conflict and the belligerent parties were not recognized as
nations).
hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention
and the law of war.53
The court had no occasion to consider whether a citizen who becomes
associated with an armed group not affiliated with an enemy government and not
otherwise covered under the terms of the Hague Convention could be detained
without charge pursuant to the law of war,54 particularly those not captured by the
military during battle.  
Confining the Territo and Quirin opinions to their facts, they may not provide
a solid  foundation for the President’s designation and detention of Padilla and
Hamdi as enemy combatants. It may be argued that the language referring to the
capture and detention of unlawful combatants — seemingly without indictment on
criminal charges — is dicta;  the petitioners in those cases did not challenge the
contention that they served in the armed forces of an enemy state with which the
United States was engaged in a declared war.  We are unaware of any U.S. precedent
confirming the constitutional power of the President to detain indefinitely a person
accused of being an unlawful combatant due to mere membership in or association
with a group that does not qualify as a legitimate belligerent, with or without the
authorization of Congress.55  The Supreme Court rejected a similar contention in the
Civil War case of Ex parte Milligan, discussed infra, where Congress had limited the
authority to detain persons in military custody.
At most, arguably, the two cases above may be read to demonstrate that, at least
in the context of a declared war against a recognized state, U.S. citizenship is not
constitutionally relevant to the treatment of members of enemy forces under the law
of war. Neither case addresses the constitutionality of the process used to determine
who is a member of an enemy force and whether a detainee qualifies for POW
privileges.  Inasmuch as the President has determined that Al Qaeda is not a state but
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(available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html]).
57  See id; supra note 12.
58 See Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 1, 8 n.16 (2001)(arguing that “[u]nder international law, war conduct and war
crimes can occur at the hands of non-state actors, but they must be participants in a war or
insurgency, or have achieved a status of belligerents or insurgents involved in an armed
conflict”). An alternate interpretation might start from the premise that what is not
prohibited by the Geneva Conventions is permitted under international law.  This appears
to be the point of departure for Judge Mukasey’s analysis in the Padilla opinion.  See Padilla
ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“It is not that the
Third Geneva Convention authorizes particular treatment for or confinement of unlawful
combatants; it is simply that that convention does not protect them.”). However, it may be
argued that GC, supra note  27, which had no corollary in previous Geneva Conventions on
prisoners, would protect persons who are not protected by GPW.  See Karman Nabulsi,
Evolving Conceptions of Civilians and Belligerents 9, 18-20, in CIVILIANS IN WAR (Simon
Chesterman, ed. 2001).
59 In Hamdi III, the court found the Geneva Conventions to be non-self-executing and
declined to address whether the petitioner is entitled to POW status. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003).  But see United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791
(S.D.Fla. 1992) (finding Geneva Conventions self-executing, entitling the petitioner to POW
status).
60  71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
61 Id. at 121.
a criminal organization to which the Geneva Convention does not apply,56 and
inasmuch as the Hague Convention would seem to apply to neither Al Qaeda nor the
Taliban for the same reasons that have been given to preclude their treatment as
prisoners of war,57 it may be argued that Al Qaeda is not directly subject to the law
of war and therefore its members may not be detained as “enemy combatants”
pursuant to it solely on the basis of their association with Al Qaeda.58  Taliban
fighters captured in Afghanistan are a closer fit within the traditional understanding
of who may be treated as an enemy combatant, but may be able to contest the
determination that they are not entitled to POW status.59 
Ex Parte Milligan.
In Ex parte Milligan,60 the Supreme Court addressed the question whether a
civilian citizen of Indiana who was allegedly a member of the Sons of Liberty, an
organized group of conspirators with alleged links to the Confederate States that
planned to commit acts of sabotage against the North, could constitutionally be tried
by military commission. The Court recognized military commission jurisdiction over
violations of the “laws and usages of war,” but stated those laws and usages “... can
never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the
government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed.”61  The
Supreme Court explained its reasoning:
It will be borne in mind that this is not a question of the power to proclaim
martial law, when war exists in a community and the courts and civil authorities
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are overthrown. Nor is it a question what rule a military commander, at the head
of his army, can impose on states in rebellion to cripple their resources and quell
the insurrection .... Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The
necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectively closes
the courts and deposes the civil administration.62
The government had argued in the alternative that Milligan could be held as a
prisoner of war “as if he had been taken in action with arms in his hands,”63 and thus
excluded from the privileges of a statute requiring courts to free persons detained
without charge.  The government argued:
Finally, if the military tribunal has no jurisdiction, the petitioner may be held as
a prisoner of war, aiding with arms the enemies of the United States, and held,
under the authority of the United States, until the war terminates, then to be
handed over by the military to the civil authorities, to be tried for his crimes
under the acts of Congress, and before the courts which he has selected.64
Milligan, however, argued “that it had been ‘wholly out of his power to have
acquired belligerent rights, or to have placed himself in such relation to the
government as to have enabled him to violate the laws of war,’”65 as he was charged.
The Court appears to have agreed with Milligan, replying:
It is not easy to see how he can be treated as a prisoner of war, when he lived in
Indiana for the past twenty years, was arrested there, and had not been, during the
late troubles, a resident of any of the states in rebellion. If in Indiana he
conspired with bad men to assist the enemy, he is punishable for it in the courts
of Indiana; but, when tried for the offence, he cannot plead the rights of war; for
he was not engaged in legal acts of hostility against the government, and only
such persons, when captured, are prisoners of war. If he cannot enjoy the
immunities attaching to the character of a prisoner of war, how can he be subject
to their pains and penalties?66
In Quirin, the Supreme Court distinguished its holding from Milligan, finding
that the petitioners were enemy belligerents and that the charge made out a valid
allegation of an offense against the law of war for which the President was authorized
to order trial by a military commission.67  The Court noted that Milligan had not been
a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, and therefore was a non-
belligerent, not subject to the law of war.68  The Sons of Liberty, it seems, did not
qualify as a belligerent for the purposes of the law of war, even though it was alleged
to be plotting hostile acts on behalf of the Confederacy.  
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71 Id. at 23-24.
72 212 U.S. at 85.  The Court noted that “[t]he facts that we are to assume are that a state of
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course of putting the insurrection down, held the plaintiff until he thought that he safely
could release him.” 
73 Id. at 84-85.
Moyer v. Peabody.
The government cites Moyer v. Peabody69 to support its contention that the
President has the authority during war, subject only  to extremely deferential review
by the courts, to detain an individual the government believes to be dangerous or
likely to assist the enemy.70  The government further asserts that the case supports the
historical “unavailability” of due process rights, such as the right to counsel, in the
case of enemy combatants.71  In Moyer, the Supreme Court declined to grant relief
to the plaintiff in a civil suit against the governor of Colorado based on the former’s
detention without charge during a miners’ strike (deemed by the governor to be an
insurrection), stating:
So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they
are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the governor is the final judge
and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office, on the ground that
he had not reasonable ground for his belief.72
The Court based its views in part on the laws and constitution of the state of
Colorado, which empowered the governor to repel or suppress insurrections by
calling out the militia, which the Court noted, envisioned the 
ordinary use of soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist, and, of
course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom
he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not
necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution, to prevent the exercise
of hostile power.73 
The Court further clarified:
If we suppose a governor with a very long term of office, it may be that a case
could be imagined in which the length of the imprisonment would raise a
different question. But there is nothing in the duration of the plaintiff’s detention
or in the allegations of the complaint that would warrant submitting the judgment
of the governor to revision by a jury. It is not alleged that his judgment was not
honest, if that be material, or that the plaintiff was detained after fears of the
insurrection were at an end. 
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stating that is well established that executive discretion to respond to emergencies does not
mean that “every sort of action the Governor may take, no matter how unjustified by the
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75 Id at 85 (citing Keely v. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 446 (1878)).
76 Id. at 85-86.
77 See, e.g., Ex parte Orozco, 201 F. 106 (W.D. Texas 1912) (alien held by military without
charge on suspicion of organizing military expedition in violation of neutrality laws awarded
damages); ex parte De la Fuente, 201 F. 119 (W.D. Texas 1912) (same); see also Hohri v.
United States, 586 F.Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d per curiam 847 F.2d 779 (Fed.
Cir.1988), cert denied 488 U.S. 925 (1988) (Japanese-American  internees and their
descendants suffered damages for unconstitutional taking based on World War II internment
where government was aware that military necessity to justify the internment was
unfounded, although suit was barred by statute of limitations).
Based on the context of the case, the holding may be limited to actual battles and
situations of martial law where troops are authorized to use deadly force as
necessary.74 While the Court notes that “[p]ublic danger warrants the substitution of
executive process for judicial process,”75 it also noted that 
[t]his was admitted with regard to killing men in the actual clash of arms; and we
think it obvious, although it was disputed, that the same is true of temporary
detention to prevent apprehended harm. As no one would deny that there was
immunity for ordering a company to fire upon a mob in insurrection, and that a
state law authorizing the governor to deprive citizens of life under such
circumstances was consistent with the 14th Amendment, we are of opinion that
the same is true of a law authorizing by implication what was done in this case.76
It may also be argued that, as a claim for civil damages rather than a direct
challenge in the form of a petition for habeas corpus, the Moyer case does not stand
for a general executive authority to detain individuals deemed to be dangerous,
without the ordinary constitutional restrictions.  As an interpretation of Colorado’s
constitution rather than that of the United States, the decision may not apply to
Presidential action.  Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion — that those
wrongfully detained by order of the President may recover damages from their
captors.77
U.S. Practice - Detention of Enemies on U.S. Territory
The following sections give a brief treatment of the twentieth-century history
of  the internment of individuals who are deemed “enemies” or determined to be too
dangerous to remain at liberty during a national emergency.  A survey of the history
reveals that  persons who are considered likely to act as an enemy agent on U.S.
territory traditionally have been treated as alien enemies rather than prisoners of war
or “enemy combatants” by the military, even when the individuals were members of
the armed forces of enemy nations, although in the latter case they might also be tried
by military tribunal or court-martial.  Persons acting within the territory of the United
States on behalf of an enemy state who were not members of the armed forces of that
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80 See Supplemental Brief for the United States in Support of the Plenary Power of Congress
over Alien Enemies, and the Constitutionality of the Alien Enemy Act 20 (1918), Ex parte
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81 40 Stat. 1650 (1917). 
82 40 Stat. 1651 (1917).
83 See Alien Enemy Brief, supra note 80, at 39. The government further argued that the issue
of what was to be done with enemy persons as well as property was dictated by policy, to
be determined by Congress rather than the courts, and did not flow as a necessary power as
the result of a declaration of war. See id. at 50 (citing Brown v. United States, (8 Cranch)
110, 126).
84 Id. at 40.
state, including American citizens accused of spying or sabotage, have been tried in
federal court. Individuals captured on the battlefield abroad have been handled in
accordance with government regulations interpreting the law of war.78  
Internment of Enemy Aliens during World War I.
The Alien Enemy Act was originally enacted in 1798 as part of the Alien and
Sedition Act,79 but saw greater use during World War I than in previous wars.80 The
statute grants the President broad authority, during a declared war or presidentially
proclaimed “predatory invasion,” to institute restrictions affecting alien enemies,
including possible detention and deportation. On April 6, 1917, the date Congress
declared war against Germany, President Wilson issued a Proclamation under the
Alien Enemy Act warning alien enemies against violations of the law or hostilities
against the United States.81  Offenders would be subject not only to the applicable
penalties prescribed by the domestic laws they violated, but would also be subject to
restraint, required to give security, or subject to removal from the United States under
regulations promulgated by the President.82
 The government urged the courts to uphold the constitutionality of the Act as
a proper exercise of Congress’ power over the persons and property of alien enemies
found on U.S. territory during war, a power it argued derives from the power of
Congress to declare war and make rules concerning captures on land and water,83 and
which was also consistent with the powers residing in sovereign nations under
international law.  The law was vital to national security because “[a]n army of spies,
incendiaries, and propagandists may be more dangerous than an army of soldiers.”84
The President reported to Congress a list of 21 instances of “improper activities of
German officials, agents, and sympathizers in the United States” prior to the
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Kingdom, France and Germany).  International law now provides protection for enemy
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supra note 27, art. 5. 
89 See Minotto v. Bradley, 252 F. 600 (N.D. Ill. 1918); Ex parte Fronklin, 253 F. 984 (N.D.
Miss. 1918).
90 Now article 106, UCMJ, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 906.
declaration of war.85  The government further argued that the statute did not require
a hearing prior to internment, because the power and duty of the President was to act
to prevent harm in the context of war, which required the ability to act based on
suspicion rather than only on proven facts.86
While the Act would permit regulations affecting all persons within the statutory
definition of alien enemy,87 it was the practice of the United States to apply
restrictions only to alien enemies who were found to constitute an active danger to
the state.88  Aliens affected by orders promulgated under the Act did not have
recourse to the courts to object to the orders on the grounds that the determination
was not made in accordance with due process of law, but could bring habeas corpus
petitions to challenge their status as enemy aliens.89  
In at least two instances, enemy spies or saboteurs entered the territory of the
United States and were subsequently arrested.  Pablo Waberski admitted to U.S.
secret agents to being a spy sent by the Germans to “blow things up in the United
States.”  Waberski, who was posing as a Russian national, was arrested upon crossing
the border from Mexico into the United States and charged with “lurking as a spy”
under article 82 of the Articles of War.90  Attorney General T. W. Gregory opined in
a letter to the President that the jurisdiction of the military to try Waberski by military
tribunal was improper, noting that the prisoner had not entered any camp or
fortification, did not appear to have been in Europe during the war, and thus could
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not have come through the fighting lines or field of military operations.91 An ensuing
disagreement between the Departments of War and Justice over the respective
jurisdictions of the FBI and military counterintelligence to conduct domestic
surveillance was resolved by compromise.92  
Waberski, an officer of the German armed forces whose real name turned out
to be Lothar Witzke, was sentenced to death by a military commission.
Subsequently, the new Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, reversed the earlier AG
opinion based on a new understanding of the facts of the case, including proof that
the prisoner was a German citizen and that there were military encampments close
to the area where he was arrested.93  President Wilson commuted Witzke’s sentence
to life imprisonment at hard labor in Fort Leavenworth and later pardoned him,
possibly due to lingering doubts about the propriety of the military tribunal’s
jurisdiction to try the accused spy,94 even though Congress had defined the crime of
spying and provided by statute that it was an offense triable by military commission.95
The question of military jurisdiction over accused enemy spies arose again in
the case of United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald,96 a habeas corpus proceeding
brought by Herman Wessels to challenge his detention by military authorities while
he was awaiting court-martial for spying.  The accused was an officer in the German
Imperial Navy who used a forged Swiss passport to enter the United States and
operated as an enemy agent in New York City.  He was initially detained as an alien
enemy pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance with statute.  He contested his
detention on the basis that the port of New York was not in the theater of battle and
courts in New York were open and functioning, arguing Milligan required that he be
tried by an Article III court.97 The court found that its inquiry was confined to
determining whether jurisdiction by court martial was valid, which it answered
affirmatively after examining relevant statutes and finding that, under international
law, the act of spying was not technically a crime.98  The court concluded that the
constitutional safeguards available to criminal defendants did not apply, noting that
whoever “joins the forces of an enemy alien surrenders th[e] right to constitutional
protections.”  The Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to address the merits
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of the case, having dismissed the appeal per stipulation of the parties.99  However,
two American citizens who were alleged to have conspired to commit espionage with
Wessels were tried and acquitted of treason in federal court,100 and subsequently
released.  
In 1918, a bill was introduced in the Senate to provide for trial by court-martial
of persons not in the military who were accused of espionage, sabotage, or other
conduct that could hurt the war effort.101  In a letter to Rep. John E. Raker explaining
his opposition to the idea, Attorney General T.W. Gregory provided statistics about
war-related arrests and prosecutions.102  According to the letter, of 508 espionage
cases that had reached a disposition, 335 had resulted in convictions, 31 persons were
acquitted, and 125 cases were dismissed.103  Sedition and disloyalty charges had
yielded 110 convictions and 90 dismissals or acquittals.104  Acknowledging that the
statistics were incomplete, the Attorney General concluded that the statistics did not
show a cause for concern.105  He also reiterated his position that trial of civilians for
offenses committed outside of military territory by court-martial would be
unconstitutional, and attributed the complaints about the inadequacies of the laws or
their enforcement to:
 
the fact that people, under the emotional stress of the war, easily magnify rumor
into fact, or treat an accusation of disloyalty as though it were equal to proof of
disloyalty.  No reason, however, has as yet developed which would justify
punishing men for crime without trying them in accordance with the time-
honored American method of arriving at the truth.106
The record does not disclose any mention of the option of deeming suspects to be
unlawful combatants based on their alleged association with the enemy, detaining
them without any kind of trial.
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110 17 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
111 See Defense Migration Report, supra note 88, at 162-66 (recounting history of general
evacuation orders issued by Lt. Gen. John De Witt, commanding general of the western
defense command).  
112 See id. at 166.  Attorney General Francis Biddle later wrote that he had opposed the
evacuation of Japanese-American citizens, and had let it be known that his Department
(continued...)
Internment of Enemies during World War II.
During the Second World War, President Roosevelt made numerous
proclamations under the Alien Enemy Act for the purpose of interning aliens deemed
dangerous or likely to engage in espionage or sabotage.107  At the outset of the war,
the internments were effected under civil authority of the Attorney General, who
established “prohibited areas” in which no aliens of Japanese, Italian, or German
descent were permitted to enter or remain, as well as a host of other restraints on
affected aliens.  The President, acting under statutory authority, delegated to the
Attorney General the authority to prescribe regulations for the execution of the
program.  Attorney General Francis Biddle created the Alien Enemy Control Unit to
review the recommendations of hearing boards handling the cases of the more than
2,500 enemy aliens in the temporary custody of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS).108
In February of 1942, the President extended the program to cover certain
citizens109 as well as enemy aliens, and turned over the authority to prescribe
“military areas” to the Secretary of War, who further delegated the responsibilities
under the order with respect to the west coast to the Commanding General of the
Western Defense Command.  The new order, Executive Order 9066,110 clearly
amended the policy established under the earlier proclamations regarding aliens and
restricted areas, but did not rely on the authority of Alien Enemy Act, as the previous
proclamations had done.111  Although the Department of Justice denied that the
transfer of authority to the Department of War was motivated by a desire to avoid
constitutional issues with regard to the restriction or detention of citizens, the House
Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration found the shift in
authority significant, as it appeared to rely on the nation’s war powers directly, and
could find no support in the Alien Enemy Act with respect to citizens.112 The
CRS-22
112 (...continued)
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of the writ of habeas corpus.”  See FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 216-17 (1962);
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V, § 501(e) (1976).
115 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 2 (1982).
116 See id. at 285 (describing impediments to full and fair hearings, including a prohibition
on detainees’ representation by an attorney, inability to object to questions, presumption in
favor of the government, and ultimate decision falling to reviewers at the Alien Enemy
Control Unit).
117 See id. at 288-89 (pointing out that there appeared to have been a greater danger of
sabotage and espionage committed by German agents, substantiated by the German
saboteurs case noted supra).
118 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 89-90 (1943) (emphasizing that the Act of
March 21, 1942, specifically provided for the enforcement of curfews).
119 Id. at 105 (also declining to address the government’s contention that an order to report
to the Civilian Control Station did not necessarily entail internment at a relocation center).
summary exercise of authority under that Act to restrain aliens was thought by the
Committee to be untenable in the case of U.S. citizens, and the War Department felt
congressional authorization was necessary to provide authority for its enforcement.113
Congress granted the War Department’s request, enacting with only minor
changes the proposed legislation providing for punishment for the knowing violation
of any exclusion order issued pursuant to Executive Order 9066 or similar executive
order.114  A policy of mass evacuation from the West Coast of persons of Japanese
descent — citizens as well as aliens — followed, which soon transformed into a
system of compulsive  internment at “relocation centers.”115 Persons of German and
Italian descent (and others) were treated more selectively, receiving prompt (though
probably not full and fair) loyalty hearings116 to determine whether they should be
interned, paroled, or released. The disparity of treatment was explained by the theory
that it would be impossible or too time-consuming to attempt to distinguish the loyal
from the disloyal among persons of Japanese descent.117
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court limited but did not explicitly strike down
the internment program. In the Hirabayashi case, the Supreme Court found the
curfew imposed upon persons of Japanese ancestry to be constitutional as a valid
war-time security measure, even as implemented against U.S. citizens, emphasizing
the importance of congressional ratification of the Executive Order.118 Hirabayashi
was also indicted for violating an order excluding him from virtually the entire west
coast, but the Court did not review the constitutionality of the exclusion measure
because the sentences for the two charges were to run concurrently.119  Because the
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restrictions affected citizens solely because of their Japanese descent, the Court
framed the relevant inquiry as a question of equal protection, asking
whether in the light of all the facts and circumstances there was any substantial
basis for the conclusion, in which Congress and the military commander united,
that the curfew as applied was a protective measure necessary to meet the threat
of sabotage and espionage which would substantially affect the war effort and
which might reasonably be expected to aid a threatened enemy invasion.120
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas added that in effect, due process
considerations did not apply to ensure that only individuals who were actually
disloyal were affected by the restrictions, even if it were to turn out that only a small
percentage of Japanese-Americans were actually disloyal.121 However, he noted that
a more serious question would arise if a citizen did not have an opportunity at some
point to demonstrate his loyalty in order to be reclassified and no longer subject to
the restrictions.122
In Korematsu,123 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an American
citizen for remaining in his home, despite the fact that it was located on a newly
declared “Military Area” and was thus off-limits to persons of Japanese descent.
Fred Korematsu also challenged the detention of Japanese-Americans in internment
camps, but the Court declined to consider the constitutionality of the detention itself,
as Korematsu’s conviction was for violating the exclusion order only.  The Court, in
effect,  validated the treatment of citizens in a manner similar to that of enemy aliens
by reading Executive Order 9066 together with the act of Congress ratifying it as
sufficient authority under the combined war powers of the President and Congress,
thus avoiding having to address the statutory scope of the Alien Enemy Act. 
In Ex parte Endo,124 however, decided the same day as Korematsu, the Supreme
Court did not find adequate statutory underpinnings to support the internment of
loyal citizens.  The Court ruled that the authority to exclude persons of Japanese
ancestry from declared military areas did not encompass the authority to detain
concededly loyal Americans.  Such authority, it found, could not be implied from the
power to protect against espionage and sabotage during wartime.125 The Court
declined to decide the constitutional issue presented by the evacuation and internment
program, instead interpreting the executive order, along with the Act of March 27,
1942 (congressional ratification of the order),126 narrowly to give it the greatest
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chance of surviving constitutional review.127  Accordingly, the Court noted that
detention in Relocation Centers was not mentioned in the statute or executive order,
but was developed during the implementation of the program.  As such, the authority
to detain citizens could only be found by implication in the Act, and must therefore
be found to serve the ends Congress and the President had intended to reach.  Since
the detention of a loyal citizen did not further the campaign against espionage and
sabotage, it could not be authorized by implication.  
The Court avoided the question of whether internment of citizens would be
constitutionally permissible where loyalty were at issue or where Congress explicitly
authorized it, but the Court’s use of the term “concededly loyal” to limit the scope
of the finding may be read to suggest that there is a Fifth Amendment guarantee of
due process applicable to a determination of loyalty or dangerousness.  While the
Fifth Amendment would not require the same process that is due in a criminal case,
it would likely require at least reasonable notice of the allegations and an opportunity
for the detainee to be heard. 
At least one American with no ethnic ties to or association with an enemy
country was subjected to an exclusion order issued pursuant to Executive Order
9066.  Homer Wilcox, a native of Ohio, was excluded from his home in San Diego
and removed by military force to Nevada, although the exclusion board had
determined that he had no association with any enemy and was more aptly described
as a “harmless crackpot.”128  He was the manager of a religious publication that
preached pacifism, and was indicted along with several others for fraud in connection
with the publication.129 The district court awarded damages in favor of Wilcox, but
the circuit court reversed, finding the exclusion within the authority of the military
command under Executive Order 9066 and 18 U.S.C. § 1383, and holding that 
the evidence concerning plaintiff’s activities and associations provided a
reasonable ground for the belief by defendant ...  that plaintiff had committed
acts of disloyalty and was engaged in a type of subversive activity and leadership
which might instigate others to carry out activities which would facilitate the
commission of espionage and sabotage and encourage them to oppose measures
taken for the military security of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, and that plaintiff’s
presence in the said areas from which he had been excluded would increase the
likelihood of espionage and sabotage and would constitute a danger to military
security of those areas.130
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The court also found that the Act of Congress penalizing violations of military orders
under Executive Order 9066 did not preclude General De Witt from using military
personnel to forcibly eject Wilcox from his home.131 
The Japanese internment program has since been widely discredited,132 the
convictions of some persons for violating the orders have been vacated,133 and the
victims have received compensation,134 but the constitutionality of detention of
citizens during war who are deemed dangerous has never expressly been ruled per
se unconstitutional.135  In the cases of citizens of other ethnic backgrounds who were
interned or otherwise subject to restrictions under Executive Order 9066, courts
played a role in determining whether the restrictions were justified, sometimes
resulting in the removal of restrictions.136  Because these persons were afforded a
limited hearing to determine their dangerousness, a court later ruled that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution did not require that they receive compensation
equal to that which Congress granted in 1988 to Japanese-American internees.137  
It may be argued that Hirabayashi and the other cases validating Executive
Order 9066 (up to a point) support the constitutionality of preventive detention of
citizens during war, at least insofar as the determination of dangerousness of the
individual interned is supported by some evidence and some semblance of due
process is accorded the internee.  However, it was emphasized in these cases that
Congress had specifically ratified Executive Order 9066 by enacting 18 U.S.C. §
1383, providing a penalty for violation of military orders issued under the Executive
Order.  Thus, even though the restrictions and internments occurred in the midst of
a declared war, a presidential order coupled with specific legislation appear to have
been required to validate the measures.  The internment of Japanese-American
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citizens without individualized determination of dangerousness was found not to be
authorized by the Executive Order and ratifying legislation (the Court thereby
avoiding the constitutional issue), although the President had issued a separate
Executive Order to set up the War Relocation Authority138 and Congress had given
its tacit support for the internments by appropriating funds for the effort.139  
The only persons who were treated as enemy combatants pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2561140 were members of the German military who had been
captured after landing on U.S. beaches from German submarines.141  Collaborators
and persons who harbored such saboteurs were tried in federal courts for treason or
violations of other statutes.142  Hans Haupt, the father of one of the saboteurs, was
sentenced to death for treason, but this sentence was overturned on the ground that
procedures used during the trial violated the defendant’s rights.143  On retrial, Haupt
was sentenced to life imprisonment, but his sentence was later commuted on the
condition that he leave the country.  Another person charged with treason for his part
in the saboteurs’ conspiracy, Helmut Leiner, was acquitted of treason but then
interned as an enemy alien.144  Anthony Cramer, an American citizen convicted of
treason for assisting one of the saboteurs to carry out financial transactions, had his
conviction overturned by the Supreme Court on the grounds that the overt acts on
which the charge was based were insufficient to prove treason.145  Emil Krepper, a
pastor living in New Jersey, came under suspicion because his name was found
printed in secret ink on the saboteur’s handkerchief, although he never met with any
of the saboteurs.  He was indicted for violating TWEA and receiving a salary from
the German government without reporting his activity as a foreign agent.146  
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These cases involving collaborators with the Quirin eight, as well as other
unrelated cases of sabotage or collaboration with the enemy during World War II, did
not result in any military determinations that those accused were enemy combatants.
It is thus not clear what kind of association with Germany or with other enemy
saboteurs, short of actual membership in the German armed forces, would have
enabled the military to detain them as enemy combatants under the law of war.147  
The Cold War.
  After the close of World War II, the Congress turned its attention to the threat
of communism. Recognizing that the Communist Party presented a different kind of
threat from that of a strictly military attack, members of Congress sought to address
the internal threat with innovative legislation.148  Introduced in the wake of the North
Korean attack on South Korea, the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1950149 was the
culmination of many legislative efforts to provide means to fight what was viewed
as a foreign conspiracy to infiltrate the United States and overthrow the government
by means of a combination of propaganda, espionage, sabotage, and terrorist acts.150
The Attorney General presented to the Congress a draft bill that would strengthen the
espionage statutes, amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and provide authority
for U.S. intelligence agencies to intercept communications.151  According to the
Attorney General, the legislation was necessary because
[t]he swift and more devastating weapons of modern warfare coupled with the
treacherous operations of those who would weaken our country internally,
preliminary to and in conjunction with external attack, have made it imperative
that we strengthen and maintain an alert and effective peacetime vigilance.152
S. 4037 combined the proposed legislation with other bills related to national
security, including measures to exclude and expel subversive aliens, to detain or
supervise aliens awaiting deportation, and to deny members of communist
organizations the right to travel on a U.S. passport.  The bill also contained a
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requirement for Communist-controlled organizations and Communist-front
organizations153 to register as such.  President Truman and opponents of the so-called
McCarran Act  thought the registration requirements and other provisions likely to
be either unconstitutional or ineffective, and expressed concern about possible far-
reaching civil liberties implications.154
Opponents of the McCarran Act sought to substitute a new bill designed to
address the security concerns in what they viewed as a more tailored manner. Senator
Kilgore introduced the Emergency Detention Act155 (Kilgore bill) to authorize the
President to declare a national emergency under certain conditions, during which the
Attorney General could enact regulations for the preventive incarceration of persons
suspected of subversive ties. At the time of the debate, 18 U.S.C. § 1383 was still on
the books and would have ostensibly supported the declaration of military areas and
the enforcement of certain restrictions against aliens or citizens deemed dangerous.
Proponents of the Kilgore bill argued that the proposed legislation would create a
program for internment of enemies that would contain sufficient procedural
safeguards to render it invulnerable to court invalidation based on Ex parte Endo.156
The final version of the ISA contained both the McCarran Act and the
Emergency Detention Act.  President Truman vetoed the bill, voicing his continued
opposition to the McCarran Act.  The President did not take a firm position with
regard to the Emergency Detention Act, stating that 
it may be that legislation of this type should be on the statute books.  But the
provisions in [the ISA] would very probably prove ineffective to achieve the
objective sought, since they would not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and
under our legal system to detain a man not charged with a crime would raise
serious constitutional questions unless the writ of habeas corpus were
suspended.157
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of warring guerrillas.”  Id at 59. 
The President recommended further study on the matter of preventive detention for
national security purposes.  Congress passed the ISA over the President’s veto.158
The Emergency Detention Act, Title II of the ISA, authorized the President to
declare an “Internal Security Emergency” in the event of an invasion of the territory
of the United States or its possessions, a declaration of war by Congress, or
insurrection within the United States in aid of a foreign enemy, where the President
deemed implementation of the measures  “essential to the preservation, protection
and defense of the Constitution.”159 The Act authorized the maintenance of the
internment and prisoner-of-war camps used during World War II for use during
subsequent crises, and authorized the Attorney General, during national emergencies
under the Act, to issue warrants for the apprehension of “those persons as to whom
there is a reasonable ground to believe that such persons probably will engage in, or
conspire to engage in acts of sabotage or espionage.”  Detainees were to be taken
before a preliminary hearing officer within 48 hours of their arrest, where each
detainee would be informed of the grounds for his detention and of his rights, which
included the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to
introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses.160 The Attorney General was
required to present evidence to the detainee and to the hearing officer or board  “to
the fullest extent possible consistent with national security.”161  Evidence that could
be used to determine whether a person could be detained as dangerous included
evidence that a person received training from or had ever committed or conspired to
commit espionage or sabotage on behalf of an entity of a foreign Communist party
or the Communist Party of the United States, or any other group that seeks the
overthrow of the government of the United States by force.162
No internal emergencies were declared pursuant to the Emergency Detention
Act, despite the United States’ involvement in active hostilities against Communist
forces in Korea and Vietnam and the continued suspicion regarding the existence of
revolutionary and subversive elements within the United States.163  Nevertheless, the
continued existence of the Act aroused concern among many citizens, who believed
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According to the legislative history, Congress repealed the penalty for violating military
orders with respect to military areas proclaimed pursuant to any executive order because the
measure had been intended only for wartime, and noted the repeal was consistent with the
earlier repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.  See H.Rept. 94-238, at 9-10 (1976).
the Act could be used as an “instrumentality for apprehending and detaining citizens
who hold unpopular beliefs and views.”164  Several bills were introduced to amend
or repeal the Act.165  The Justice Department supported the repeal of the Act, opining
that the potential advantage offered by the statute in times of emergency was
outweighed by the benefits that repealing the detention statute would have by allaying
the fears and suspicions (however unfounded they might have been) of concerned
citizens.166
Congress decided to repeal the Emergency Detention Act in toto in 1971, and
enacted in its place a prohibition on the detention of American citizens except
pursuant to an act of Congress.167 The new language was intended to prevent a return
to the pre-1950 state of affairs, in which “citizens [might be] subject to arbitrary
executive authority” without prior congressional action.168  Executive Order 9066
was formally rescinded in 1976.169 Congress repealed 18 U.S.C. § 1383 later that
year.170 
It may be argued that Congress, in passing the Emergency Detention Act in
1950, was legislating based on its constitutional war powers, to provide for the
preventive detention during national security emergencies of those who might be
expected to act as enemy agents, though not technically within the definition of “alien
enemies.”  It does not, therefore, appear that Congress contemplated that the
President already had the constitutional power to declare such individuals to be
enemy combatants, subject to detention under the law of war, except under very
narrow circumstances. The much earlier legislative history accompanying the passage
of the Alien Enemy Act may also be interpreted to suggest that the internment of
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172 See Allan Thompson, Canadian Held at U.S. Military Base, TORONTO STAR, 8/3/02, at
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enemy spies and saboteurs in war was not ordinarily a military power that could be
exercised by the President alone, or at least, not a power with which Congress could
not constitutionally interfere.171
The repeal of the Emergency Detention Act and the enactment of 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a) may be interpreted to preclude the detention of American citizens as enemy
agents or traitors unless convicted of a crime.  If the law of war traditionally supports
the detention of such persons as enemy combatants or unlawful combatants, it may
be questioned why such an approach has not been utilized during past conflicts,
during which the internal security risk of hostile action by “fifth columnists,” spies,
and saboteurs was frequently perceived to equal the danger of military clashes on the
battlefield.
Current “Enemy Combatant” Cases
Two U.S. citizens are known to be held in the United States as enemy
combatants. It has been reported that one Canadian citizen is being held in U.S.
military custody in the United States after his arrest by the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service.172  It is unclear whether the man, Mohamed Mansour Jabarah,
is considered an “enemy combatant,” but he is reportedly being held for interrogation
and has not been charged with any offense. A Qatari national who was lawfully
present in the United States has also been declared an “enemy combatant” and turned
over to military custody.  The man, Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, was originally
detained as a material witness on December 12, 2001, in connection with the
investigation into the attacks of September 11, 2001.  He was later charged with
credit card fraud and scheduled to stand trial beginning July 21, 2003.  However, on
June 23, 2003, President Bush designated him an “enemy combatant” and directed
that he be transferred to the Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina,
where he is currently being held.  His attorneys filed a petition for habeas corpus on
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his behalf in the District Court for the Central District of Illinois, which dismissed
the petition for improper venue.173
The Case of Yaser Esam Hamdi.
 Hamdi’s case may be likened to Territo in that he was captured on a field of
battle and was not charged with committing any offense.  In Territo, the court cited
the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War as the
legal authority for the detention of the petitioner as a prisoner of war, and the
petitioner did not dispute that he had served as a member of the Italian armed forces,
with which the United States was then at war.  The sole question before the court was
whether a U.S. citizen could lawfully be treated as a prisoner of war under U.S. law
and the law of war.  Territo did not contest his capture as a war prisoner or claim that
his rights under the 1929 Geneva Convention had been violated.
 Hamdi, however, reportedly claims that he is not a member of Al Qaeda or the
Taliban and was present in Afghanistan only to provide humanitarian assistance.174
The Fourth Circuit has agreed that “[i]t has long been established that if Hamdi is
indeed an ‘enemy combatant’ who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the
government’s present detention of him is a lawful one.”175  In its latest decision, the
Fourth Circuit ordered the district judge  to dismiss the petition, holding essentially
that a determination by the military that an individual is an enemy combatant is
conclusive, so long as it is supported by some evidence.176  
In the first interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated a district court order
that the prisoner be provided immediate, unmonitored access to an attorney, urging
the district court to show deference to the government in its examination of the issue,
but expressly declining to embrace the “sweeping proposition” that “with no
meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant
could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government’s say-
so.”177 
On remand, the district court ordered the government to provide additional
information to support its conclusion that Hamdi is an enemy combatant.178  The
court found the petitioner to be entitled to due process of law under the Fifth
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Amendment,179 and expressed the intent to inquire into the authority of the person
making the determination of Hamdi’s status, whether the screening criteria used to
determine such status meet due process requirements, the national security aims
served by his continued detention, and whether the relevant military regulations and
international law require a different procedure.180  The government appealed the order
to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the proof already submitted to the court, which
consisted of a declaration by Michael Mobbs, a special advisor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, is sufficient as a matter of law to establish the
legality of the detention.181 The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that the government
has presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the habeas corpus requirements to justify
retaining Hamdi in military custody.182  The court declared that since the Hamdi
petition conceded that Hamdi had been seized in Afghanistan during a time of
military hostilities, there are no disputed facts that would necessitate the evidentiary
hearing ordered by the district court, which could also involve a significant
interference with the war effort.183  The court also disposed of the legal arguments put
forth on Hamdi’s behalf, finding that 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) does not apply and that the
Geneva Conventions are non-self-executing treaties and therefore do not give
individuals a right of action. The court vacated the production order issued by the
district court and ordered the petition to be dismissed. 
In sum, the Fourth Circuit has validated the Executive authority to detain
persons captured by the military on the battlefield during hostilities authorized by
Congress, regardless of their U.S. citizenship.  Under Hamdi II, the federal courts are
not empowered to hear the prisoner on the question of whether his designation as an
“enemy combatant” by the military was factually supported or whether the
determination was made in such a manner as to comply with the Constitution, DoD
regulations regarding the capture and detention of persons in war, or international
law.  However, the court stressed that Hamdi’s capture and detention by American
allied forces “in a foreign theater of operations during active hostilities” and
determination by the United States military that he was allied with enemy forces set
his case apart from that of Jose Padilla, discussed infra.  
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The Case of Jose Padilla.
The government argues that the case of Jose Padilla, who was arrested in
Chicago and alleged to be involved in a plot to detonate a “dirty bomb,” is very
similar to the facts behind Ex parte Quirin.  A federal judge agreed, noting that the
facts alleged by the government would, if true, validate the government’s authority
to detain him under military custody.184  However, the petitioner argued that Quirin
is inapposite, given that the eight saboteurs in 1942 were charged and tried by
military commission, and were given access to an attorney.  The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit agreed with the petitioner, reversing the district court’s finding.185
It may also be argued that the case bears closer resemblance to the Civil War case Ex
parte Milligan186 than to either the Quirin or Territo cases.  
The government argues that Milligan is inapposite to the petition of Padilla on
the grounds that Padilla, like petitioners in Quirin, is “a belligerent associated with
the enemy who sought to enter the United States during wartime in an effort to aid
the enemy’s commission of hostile acts, and who therefore is subject to the laws of
war.”187 (This, presumably, is to be contrasted with the case of Milligan, who was a
civilian and had never traveled outside the state of Indiana.)  
The government does not allege that Padilla entered the country illegally or
landed as part of a military offensive.  In Quirin, the petitioners were members of the
German armed forces and admitted to having entered the country surreptitiously by
way of German naval submarine.  The government’s argument appears to presume
that there is no relevant difference between the landing of the German saboteurs and
Padilla’s entry into the United States by means of a commercial flight, neither under
disguise nor using false identification.188  Under this theory, the relevant factor would
appear to be whether the petitioner had ever left the country and traveled to “enemy
territory,” regardless of how he re-entered the country. 
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However, it may be argued that under Quirin, the surreptitious nature of the
petitioners’ arrival onto the territory of the United States through coastal defenses,
by means of enemy vessels that would have been lawful targets had the Navy or
Coast Guard identified them as such, was a major determinant of the petitioners’
status as enemy combatants.189  Had they entered the country openly and lawfully,
they might not have lost their right to be treated as prisoners of war.  Padilla’s arrival
by apparently lawful means arguably has no bearing on whether he is subject to
military jurisdiction.  
The government disputes Padilla’s claim that the laws of war do not apply to Al
Qaeda and thus could never apply to him.  The government finds support for the
opposite claim in The Prize Cases.190  Because the President has, by Executive Order,
recognized a state of war against Al Qaeda, the government argues the laws of war
must apply, and anyone associated with Al Qaeda may therefore properly be deemed
to be “enemy belligerents.” However, it is not clear that Al Qaeda is a belligerent
under the law of war, because such status would ordinarily imply belligerent rights
that the Administration has been unwilling to concede.
The government argues that Milligan is inapposite; “whereas Milligan was not
engaged in legal acts of hostility against the government, ... the President determined
that Padilla engaged in hostile and war-like acts.”191  However, the quoted language
from Ex parte Quirin may be somewhat misleading, inasmuch as Milligan was
indeed alleged to have engaged in hostile and warlike acts, but these were not legal
acts of hostility because Milligan was not a lawful combatant.  Thus, whether
Milligan applies may depend on the emphasis placed on the legality of the acts of
hostility of which Milligan was accused, rather than whether Milligan was engaged
in acts of hostility at all. The Milligan opinion seems to view the nature of the
legality of the acts to be based on Milligan’s legitimacy as a belligerent rather than
the nature of the acts.  It may be argued that Padilla, like Milligan, was not engaged
in legal acts of hostility, because he is not a lawful belligerent. Milligan’s
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membership in the Sons of Liberty did not secure his legitimacy as a belligerent, but
neither did it give the government the right to detain him as a prisoner of war.192  
The government further argues that Milligan is inapposite in this case because
Milligan, “not being a part of or associated with armed forces of the enemy,” could
not be held as a belligerent, while Padilla, in contrast, is alleged to be associated with
the armed forces of the enemy.  However, it might be recalled that the government
had argued that Milligan was allegedly associated with the Confederate Army, a
recognized belligerent, and that he was in effect accused of acting as an unlawful
belligerent.193  Therefore, it may be argued that the important distinction in Quirin
was the nature and status of the enemy forces with whom he was associated, rather
than whether he was associated with a hostile force at all. The petitioners in Quirin
were all actual members of the armed forces of an enemy in a declared war.  What
association with the enemy short of membership in its armed forces might have
brought the saboteurs under military jurisdiction is unclear.  
The continuing validity of Milligan has been questioned by some scholars, even
though the Quirin Court declined to overrule it, while others assert that the essential
meaning of the case has only to do with situations of martial law or, perhaps, civil
wars.  Furthermore, it has been noted that the portion of the plurality in Milligan
asserting that Congress could not constitutionally authorize the President to use the
military to detain and try civilians may be considered dicta with correspondingly less
precedential value, inasmuch as Congress had implicitly denied such authority.  At
any rate, modern courts have seemed less inclined to challenge the Executive’s
authority in war or its interpretation of the law of war.  Courts may treat the question
of whether  belligerents are legitimate — or whether that matters — as non-
justiciable. 
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Constitutional Authority to Detain “Enemy Combatants”
The law of war permits belligerents to seize the bodies and property of enemy
aliens.194 The Administration has taken the view that the authority to detain “enemy
combatants” belongs to the President alone, and that any interference in that authority
by Congress would thus be unconstitutional.195  However, the Constitution explicitly
gives to Congress the power to make rules concerning captures on land and water,196
which has long supported Congress’ authority to regulate the capture and disposition
of prizes of war as well as confiscation of property belonging to enemy aliens.197  
 Both sides point to the Steel Seizure Case198 to provide a framework for the
courts to decide the extent of the President’s authority.  In that Korean War-era case,
the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a presidential order seizing control of
steel mills that had ceased production due to a labor dispute, an action justified by
President Truman on the basis of wartime exigencies, despite the absence of
legislative authority.  Justice Jackson set forth the following oft-cited formula to
determine whether Presidential authority is constitutional:
1.  When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . .  A seizure executed by the
President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of
presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
 2.  When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain.  Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference
or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility.  In this area, any actual test
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of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
 3.  When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case
only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.  Presidential claim
to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution,
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.199
The parties disagree as to where in this formula the present actions fall.  Padilla
and Hamdi, and their supporters generally argue that such constitutional authority,
if it exists, is dependant upon specific authorization by Congress, which they argue
is missing (or even explicitly denied) in the present circumstances, placing the
controversy into the second or third category above.  The government, on the other
hand, sees the issue as one that falls squarely into the first category, asserting that
Congressional authority for the detentions clearly exists, although such authority is
not strictly necessary.  Congressional authority, the government argues, may be found
in the Authorization to Use Force200 and a provision of title 10, U.S.C., authorizing
payment for expenses related to detention of prisoners of war. Accordingly, the
following sections examine the constitutional authority to take prisoners in war and,
if congressional authority is required, whether Congress has provided it.
The Authorization to Use Force.
The government argues, and two federal courts have agreed, that the
identification and detention of enemy combatants is encompassed within Congress’
express authorization to the President “to use force against those ‘nations,
organizations, or persons he determines’ were responsible for the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks.”201  Some argue, however, that since Congress only authorized
force and did not formally declare war, that the absence of language explicitly
addressing the detention of either alien enemies or American citizens cannot be read
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The government asserts that the lack of a formal declaration of war is not
relevant to the existence of a war and unnecessary to invoke the law of war.  While
a declaration is unnecessary for the existence of an armed conflict according to the
international law of war, it may be argued that a formal declaration is necessary to
determine what law applies domestically, whether to aliens or citizens.203  For
example, the Alien Enemy Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA),204 both
of which regulate the domestic conduct of persons during a war, expressly require a
declared war and are not triggered by the authorization to use force.205  The
Emergency Detention Act, in effect from 1950 to 1971, had similar requirements
prior to the invocation of its measures. 
At least one statutory provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
that might authorize the military to detain certain civilians  “in time of war” has been
interpreted to mean only a war declared by Congress.206  There is also military
jurisdiction to try any person “caught lurking as a spy” during time of war,207
including citizens,208 or anyone suspected of aiding or abetting the enemy.209  It has
not been decided whether the phrase “in time of war” or reference to “the enemy” in
the these articles of the UCMJ also require a declaration of war by Congress;
however, the same reasoning applied in Averette210 and followed in Robb could be
found to apply here, at least with respect to persons who may not claim combatant
status:
A recognition [that the conflict in Vietnam qualifies as a war in the ordinary
sense of the word] should not serve as a shortcut for a formal declaration of war,
at least in the sensitive area of subjecting civilians to military jurisdiction
On the other hand, the Manual for Courts Martial (MCM) defines “time of war” to
include declared war as well as “a factual determination by the President that the
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existence of hostilities warrants a finding that a ‘time of war’” exists for the punitive
portions of the MCM.211  Likewise, with respect to conduct on the part of military
members, the MCM does not restrict references to “enemy”  to mean an enemy
government or its armed forces.212  For example, the offense of “misbehavior before
the enemy” does not require a declaration of war.213  It should be noted that these
offenses are associated with conduct on the battlefield.
The government notes that its military practice has long been to detain enemy
combatants in conflicts where war was not formally declared and Congress did not
expressly authorize the capture of enemies.  However, we are not aware of any
modern court ruling as to whether and under what circumstances citizens may be held
as “enemy combatants,” where no formal declaration of war has been enacted.  It may
be argued that any authorization to employ ground troops against an enemy army
necessarily encompasses the authority to capture battlefield enemies, because it is an
essential aspect of fighting a battle.  International law does not permit the intentional
killing of civilians or soldiers who are hors de combat, preferring capture as the
method of neutralizing enemies on the battlefield.214  However, the war powers
involving conduct off the battlefield, such as those authorizing the detention of alien
enemies or regulating commerce with the enemy, are not necessarily a vital aspect
of the use of the military, and have traditionally been subject to legislation and not
implied by circumstance. For example, the Supreme Court held that the President has
no implied authority to promulgate regulations permitting the capture of enemy
property during hostilities short of a declared war, even where Congress had
authorized a “limited” war.215  
It may be argued that, because the internment of enemy aliens as potential spies
and saboteurs pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act216 requires a declaration of war or a
presidential proclamation, it would seem reasonable to infer that the express
permission of Congress is necessary for other forms of military detention of non-
military persons within the United States, especially those who are U.S. citizens.217
To conclude otherwise would appear to require an assumption that Congress intended
in this instance to authorize the President to detain American citizens under fewer
restrictions than apply in the case of enemy aliens during a declared war.218
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Padilla at 724.  The court viewed it as
...unlikely — indeed, inconceivable — that Congress would expressly provide in the Joint
Resolution an authorization required by the War Powers Resolution [50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)]
but, at the same time, leave unstated and to inference something so significant and
unprecedented as authorization to detain American citizens under[18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)].
Id.
219 The missile attack of alleged Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen in November, 2002, by an
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on this concept of the war against terrorism.  See  Dworkin, supra note 1.  According to one
DoD official:
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of global reach as a “war.” This accurately portrays the state of armed conflict that exists
and the resulting military actions to combat the continuing threat of terrorist acts against
the United States and our friends and allies.
[T]he United States is involved in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and other global
terrorists and those who harbor and support such terrorists. As such, the law of armed
conflict with regards to targeting and “hors de combat” applies in this conflict as it would
in any other.
See id. (excerpts from interview with Charles Allen, Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs
at the Department of Defense).
220 See id.; Paust, supra note 58, at 8; Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood:
Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order,  81
N.C. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2002)(arguing U.S. policy on terrorism is blurring law enforcement,
military intervention, and the killing of suspected enemies).
221 See Respondents’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus at 26, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush (02 Civ. 4445).
However, it might also be argued that the United States is a battlefield in the war
against terrorism in more than just a metaphorical sense.  The AUF appears to
authorize the use of force anywhere in the world, including the territory of the United
States, against any persons determined by the President to have “planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or “harbored such organizations or
persons.” Under this view, the United States is under actual and continuing enemy
attack, and Congress delegated to the President the authority to declare those persons
he determined to be subject to the AUF to be wartime enemies.  The U.S. military
would be authorized to use force to kill or capture persons it identifies as “enemy
combatants,” even within the United States.219  However, those seeking a less
expansive interpretation of the AUF might argue that it must be read, if possible, to
conform to international law and the Constitution.  Under this view, for example, it
might be questioned whether those sources of law provide adequate basis for a war
against alleged members of a criminal organization and those who harbor them.220
Title 10, U.S.C.
The government argues that even if Congress did not explicitly authorize the
detention of enemy combatants in its resolution authorizing force, “Congress has
otherwise made clear its acceptance and assumption that the President’s
Commander-in-Chief powers in a time of war encompasses the detention of enemy
belligerents.”221  This authority, it argues, is to be found in 10 U.S.C. § 956(5), which
authorizes the use of appropriated funds for “expenses incident to the maintenance,
CRS-42
222  Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 467-68. 
223  352 F.3d at 723 (citing 323 U.S. at 303 n.24).
224 P.L. 77-353, title III § 103, 55 Stat. 810, 813 (1941).
225 Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942: Hearing on H.R. 6159
before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 77th Cong., at 78-79 (1941).
226 See id.
pay, and allowance of prisoners of war” as well as  “other persons in the custody of
the Army, Navy, or Air Force whose status is determined by the Secretary concerned
to be similar to prisoners of war.”  The Administration interprets the phrase “similar
to prisoners of war” to include “enemy combatants” who are not treated as prisoners
of war.   The Hamdi court agreed with this position,222 however, the Padilla court
rejected it based on its interpretation of Ex parte Endo requiring that language
authorizing funds must “clearly” and “unmistakably” authorize the detention of
American citizens.223
It is not clear from the legislative history of 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) that Congress
accepted the notion that there is a category of wartime detainees separate from
prisoners of war and interned alien enemies.  The language was first codified into
title 10, U.S.C. in 1984, but has long been included in appropriations bills for the
Department of Defense.  It first appeared in the Third Supplemental National Defense
Appropriation Act of 1942,224 when the Army requested an addition to the defense
appropriations bill to provide the authority for the Secretary of War to 
utilize any appropriation available for the Military Establishment under such
regulation as the Secretary of War may prescribe for all expenses incident to the
maintenance, pay and allowances of prisoners of war, other persons in Army
custody whose status is determined by the Secretary of War to be similar to
prisoners of war, and persons detained in Army custody, pursuant to Presidential
proclamation.225
It was explained that the expenses were in connection with keeping and
maintaining prisoners of war and others in military custody not provided for by any
appropriation; the example given was the construction of stockade authorized to be
built in Honolulu and water supply for prisoners on Oahu.226  The following colloquy
took place during Senate debate on the bill:
Mr. DANAHER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee permit me to
invite his attention to page 9 of the bill before he starts on a new title?
Mr. McKELLAR. Certainly. 
Mr. DANAHER. In lines 2 and 3 on page 9, we find that the committee has
amended the bill to provide ‘for all expenses incident to the maintenance, pay,
and allowances of prisoners of war,” and notably, “other persons in Army
custody whose status is determined by the Secretary of War to be similar to
prisoners of war.” That is new language, apparently, and I should like to have the
Senator explain what other class of persons there may be in Army custody whose
status is similar to that of prisoners of war. 
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Mr. McKELLAR. Enemies who are found in this country are taken up by the
Army, and they have to be provided for. It was testified that at times it was  very
necessary to arrest civilians and to provide for their care.
Mr. DANAHER. I have not the slightest doubt that it is necessary, Is there
existing law under which they are at  present being taken up by the Army?
Mr. McKELLAR. The Army did not  want to take a chance about it. 
Mr, DANAHER. Is there an existing law under which such persons are today
being taken up by the Army and being held as prisoners?
Mr. McKELLAR. The advice to the Committee was that there is not, and in order
to make it absolutely sure the committee thought there should be such a
provision, and this provision was inserted. I am quite sure the Senator will, under
the circumstances, agree that it should be included in the bill. 
Mr. DANAHER. I have not the slightest question that it is absolutely necessary
that certain classes of persons be taken up, not allowed to roam at large to our
detriment. There is no question  as to that. All I wish to know is where authority
to do that is found in the law.  Is their status defined? Under what  circumstances
may they be taken up? If there be no such authority anywhere, then I think we
should very promptly and properly direct our attention to such a field. We
certainly are not going to authorize it merely by providing in an appropriation bill
for an allotment of money to be paid after they are taken up. 
Mr. McKELLAR. The Senator misunderstands me. The appropriation is not to
pay for their being taken up, but it is to maintain them and to keep them safely
after they are taken up by whatever authority, that this appropriation is
recommended.
Mr. DANAHER. The Senator feels he is quite correct in saying that up to now
there is no authorization provided by statute for their being taken up by the
Army?
Mr. McKELLAR There is no authorization for taking care of them and feeding
them and imprisoning them, and no place to imprison them, as I understand. 
Mr. DANAHER. I thank the Senator.227
Prior to the amendment coming up for a vote, Senator Danaher took the occasion to
look up which sections of law provided authority for the Army to detain persons, and
concluded the authority was to be found in the Alien Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21,
which he read into the Record in its entirety and explained:
I understand that since the first of the week the President has in fact issued
proclamations under the authority of the section just quoted, and that so much of
this section as applies to prisoners of war and those whom the Secretary of War
may deem to be similar in status to prisoners of war, is comprehended within the
terms of the proclamations that are applicable outside the immediate territorial
limits of the United States.  In view of the fact that that important section does
implement both the statute and the proclamations issued pursuant thereto, I feel
that it is important that the Record should show what the situation is.228
The amendment was agreed to.  Similar language has appeared in subsequent
defense appropriations until 1983, when it was added to title 10 as a note to section
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138,229 and then codified in 1984 in its present form.230  The Senate debate did not
question the President’s authority to detain prisoners of war, despite the absence of
express statutory authority, but only questioned the meaning of “other persons similar
to prisoners of war.”  The legislative history could be interpreted to demonstrate that
the language was meant only to pay for the exercise of authority found elsewhere, in
particular the provisions of 50 U.S.C. § 21.  It is unlikely that 10 U.S.C. §956(5)
would be interpreted as amending 50 U.S.C. § 21 with respect to the requirement for
a declared war or Presidential proclamation.  As an appropriations measure, it
probably could not be interpreted to authorize by implication what Congress has not
provided for elsewhere, nor is it likely that the language would be interpreted to
repeal by implication express language contradicting the interpretation. 
  
Legislation regarding prisoners of war and enemy aliens subsequent to the
Defense Authorization Act arguably supports the understanding that, at least on the
territory of the United States, Congress did not contemplate that any persons would
be interned in any status other than that of prisoner of war or enemy alien.  In 1945,
at the request of the Attorney General Biddle, Congress enacted a provision making
it a criminal offense to procure or aid in the escape of persons interned as prisoners
of war or alien enemies.231  The provision was recommended to fill a gap in the law,
which provided for the punishment of persons who procure or aid the escape of
prisoners properly in the custody of the Attorney General or confined in any penal or
correctional institution.232  
18 U.S.C. 4001(a).
The petitioners in both Hamdi and Padilla assert that Congress expressly has
forbidden the detention of U.S. citizens without statutory authority, and that no
statutory support for the detention of U.S. citizens as “enemy combatants” can be
found. They cite 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which provides:
No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress.
This language originated with the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act233 in 1971.
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to prevent recurrence of
internments in detention camps such as those that had occurred during the Second
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World War with respect to Japanese-Americans.234  The language “imprisoned or
otherwise detained” in 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) would appear broad enough to include
detention pursuant to the law of war,235 and has been construed literally by the
Supreme Court to proscribe “detention of any kind by the United States absent a
congressional grant of authority to detain.”236  
Attorney General Ashcroft has argued that 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) does not apply
to enemy combatants detained by the President under his authority as Commander-in-
Chief.237  The Attorney General has expressed doubt that Congress has the
constitutional authority to interfere with the President’s authority to detain enemy
combatants.238  The Department of Justice notes that 18 U.S.C. § 4001(b) refers to
federal penal and correctional institutions, except for military or naval institutions,
and thus concludes that § 4001(a) likewise refers only to federal penitentiaries.239
Further, the Attorney General points to statements made by Abner Mikva and others
during floor debate on the act repealing the Emergency Detention Act, to the effect
that the legislation would not affect any inherent authority the President might have
to detain citizens for national security reasons.240
The district court judge in the Padilla case declined to employ the suggested
canons of statutory interpretation or to address the constitutionality of
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), finding the language unambiguous on its face.241 The judge
found that § 4001(a) clearly applies to the present case, but that Padilla’s detention
conforms to § 4001(a) because it is carried out pursuant to an act of Congress.242  The
Second Circuit reversed that ruling, and rejected the arguments based on statutory
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placement as inapplicable and unnecessary to interpret § 4001(a).243  The Fourth
Circuit found that § 4001(a) was not intended to apply to enemy combatants, since
there was no evidence in the legislative record that Congress had intended to
“overturn the long-standing rule that an armed and hostile American citizen captured
on the battlefield during wartime may be treated like the enemy combatant that he
is.”244
The Detention of Enemy Combatants Act
The Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 1029, would assert
congressional authority to limit the detention of U.S. persons as enemy combatants
to defined circumstances and address some of the due process concerns that have
been raised with respect to the designation of enemy combatants. H.R. 1029 would
authorize the President to detain U.S. citizens and residents who are determined to
be “enemy combatants” in accordance with procedures established by the Secretary
of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.  The
bill would permit detainees to have access to attorneys to challenge the basis for their
detention, and would not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.  The bill would not
apply to combatants captured on a battlefield overseas or suspected criminals arrested
abroad who are not U.S. citizens or residents.
Section-by-section Analysis.
Section 2. Findings.  H.R. 1029 would find that the United States is at war
with Al Qaeda as justified under international law for certain terrorist attacks.  Paras.
1-6.  The bill would take note of the difficulties inherent in determining who is an
enemy combatant in the context of the present war, but reaffirm the need to detain
enemy combatants as appropriate “to protect the safety of the public and those
involved in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism, to facilitate the use of
classified evidence without compromising intelligence or military efforts, to gather
unimpeded vital information from the detainee, and otherwise to protect national
security interests.”  Para. 8-9.  Further, the bill would find that the Executive must
be allowed broad latitude to establish regulations for determining which U.S. citizens
and residents may be detained, and that courts must give broad deference to military
judgment in such matters. Para. 10.  It would verify that section 4001(a) of title 18,
U.S. Code “proscribes detention of any kind ... absent a congressional grant of
authority to detain.”  Para. 11.  The bill would find that Congress has authorized the
President to detain U.S. persons “who are members of al Qaeda, or knowingly
cooperated with members of al Qaeda in the planning, authorizing, committing,
aiding or abetting of one or more terrorist acts against the United States.”  Para. 12.
The bill would find that constitutional protection does not cease during wartime,
para. 13, and declare that it does not authorize the detention of U.S. persons as enemy
combatants “indefinitely without charges and hold them incommunicado without a
hearing and without access to counsel on the basis of a unilateral determination that
the person may be connected with an organization that intends harm to the United
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States.”  Para. 14.  It would reaffirm the right to habeas corpus, para. 15, and declare
that Congress “has a responsibility for maintaining vigorous oversight of detention
of [U.S. persons] to assure ... due process.”  Para. 16.
Section 3. Detention of Enemy Combatants.  Section 3 authorizes the
detention of enemy combatants, which it defines as U.S. persons or residents “who
are members of Al Qaeda or knowingly cooperated with a member of al Qaeda in the
planning, authorizing, committing, aiding or abetting of one or more terrorist acts
against the United States,” but who are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status.  The
authority to establish the standards, process, and criteria to be used for the “enemy
combatant” designation would be delegated to the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.  It would not
require different procedures depending on the circumstances of capture or arrest of
the designee, but, assuming the Act would apply extraterritorially, presumably the
military would continue using rules of engagement developed for a particular military
operation to identify enemy combatants during battle, at least until it could be
determined whether a captured person is a U.S. person.
Section 4.  Procedural Requirements.  The procedural rules established
under section 3 would be required to establish clear standards and procedures that
would preserve the Government’s ability to detain U.S. persons or residents who may
threaten the United States or who might be able to furnish valuable intelligence.  The
rules would also be required to contain procedures for the protection of classified
information or information that, if released, could impede the investigation of
terrorism.  Lastly, the rules would also have to provide detainees with timely access
to judicial review (in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, according
to sec. 5(b)) and access to counsel.  
Section 5. Detention.  Section 5 would limit the duration of detention under
the Act to a period in which the President certifies that the war against Al Qaeda is
ongoing and that there is “an investigation with a view toward prosecution, a
prosecution, or a post-trial proceeding” in the case of the detainee.  Because it does
not expressly limit the latter requirement to proceedings before Article III courts, the
condition might arguably be satisfied by trial by military commission or some other
administrative tribunal.245  The President would also have to certify that detention is
warranted to prevent the detainee “from aiding persons attempting to commit terrorist
acts against the United States.”  The certification would have to be renewed after 180
days, with no limit on the number of successive certifications.  Subsection (c) would
authorize the Secretary of Defense to designate an appropriate location for the
detentions authorized under the Act, and would list minimal requirements for the
condition of detention to ensure humane treatment.
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Section 6.  Reports to Congress.  Section 6 would require an annual report
to Congress identifying each individual “subject to, or detained pursuant to the
authority of [the] Act.”  It is unclear who would be “subject to” the provisions of
H.R. 1029 but not detained pursuant to them.  Perhaps the phrase “subject to ... the
Act” is meant to cover those who are detained within the regular criminal justice
system or pursuant to the authority of immigration laws, but who fit the criteria to be
deemed enemy combatants.  
Section 7. United States Person or Resident Defined.  Section 7
borrows the definition of “U.S. person” from section 101(i) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(i)), which currently covers
a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence
(as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of title 8), an unincorporated association a
substantial number of members of which are citizens of  the United States or
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is
incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an
association which  is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3)
of  this section.
“Lawfully admitted for permanent residence” is defined under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(20) to mean “the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of
residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the
immigration laws, such status not having changed.”  Section 7 of H.R. 1029 also
includes a separate subsection that defines “U.S. person or resident” to include “an
alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.”  It is unclear
whether this language is intended cover a broader category of persons than the
definition already referenced in subsection (1).  It appears that H.R. 1029 would not
reach aliens lawfully admitted to the United States on a temporary basis or who are
awaiting final approval of their applications for permanent residence, nor would it
reach aliens present in the United States unlawfully.  This omission could be read
either to imply that the President has the inherent authority under the Constitution to
detain persons not covered under the definition in section 7, or unless Congress has
provided such authority elsewhere, it could be read to preclude the detention of  such
persons as enemy combatants.
Section 8.  Termination of Authority.  Section 8 is a sunset provision
terminating the above authority as of December 31, 2005.  The authority would
effectively terminate earlier if the armed conflict with Al Qaeda were to end prior to
that date.
Possible Legal Issues.  Petitioners on behalf of U.S. citizens held in
military custody argue that 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which prohibits the detention of U.S.
citizens except as authorized by an act of Congress, prohibits the military’s detention
of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants.  While H.R. 1029 would appear to resolve the
question of whether statutory law prohibits the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy
combatants, it leaves open some legal questions pertaining to the detention of persons
as enemy combatants that may arise under the Constitution and international law.  
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Some Constitutional Questions.  The Supreme Court has never expressly
upheld the administrative detention or internment of U.S. citizens and non-alien
enemies during war as a preventive measure.   
Congressional Authority.  In Ex parte Milligan,246 the Supreme Court
invalidated a military detention and sentence of a civilian for violations of the law of
war, despite accusations that Milligan conspired and committed hostile acts against
the United States.247  A plurality of the Milligan Court agreed that Congress was not
empowered to authorize the President to assert military jurisdiction in areas not
subject to martial law, but scholars disagree as to whether that portion of the opinion
is binding as law or is merely dicta.  The Administration may take the view that only
the President, and not Congress, has the constitutional authority to detain enemy
combatants, but it appears from the historical survey above that the contention lacks
any solid legal precedent.  
The Korematsu248 decision is frequently cited as upholding the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II, but the Supreme Court expressly limited
its decision to the legality of excluding these citizens from declared military areas.
Ex parte Endo249 invalidated the detention of a U.S. citizen who was “concededly
loyal” to the United States, possibly implying that the detention of disloyal citizens
may be permissible under some circumstances, but leaving open the question of what
constitutional due process is required to determine the loyalty of persons the
government sought to intern.  In 1950, Congress passed the Emergency Detention
Act (EDA),250 which authorized the President to declare an “Internal Security
Emergency,” during which the President could authorize the apprehension and
detention of any person deemed reasonably likely to engage in acts of espionage or
sabotage.  However, this authority was never exercised, and the EDA was repealed
without any court having had the opportunity to evaluate its constitutionality.251  H.R.
1029 would guarantee access to counsel and the right to challenge detention by
petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, but gives the executive little other guidance
as to what due process the Act requires.  
Bill of Attainder.  H.R. 1029 may be subject to criticism for possibly violating
the constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder.252  The Constitution prohibits
Congress from enacting legislation to punish specific persons or easily identifiable
groups of persons.253 Section 3 of H.R. 1029 would authorize the President to detain
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persons based on their membership in Al Qaeda or knowing cooperation with a
member of Al Qaeda. Although the stated purpose for the detention appears to be
preventive rather than punitive, the nature of the restraint and the requirement that
non-members of Al Qaeda act “knowingly” probably make it punitive for the purpose
of finding a bill of attainder.254  However, section 5 would require a certification that
there is “an ongoing investigation with a view toward prosecution, a prosecution, or
a post-trial proceeding” and that the detention is warranted to prevent the person from
contributing to terrorist acts against the United States.  The requirement for an
individualized finding of dangerousness would likely defeat any challenges that the
Act amounts to a legislative determination of guilt.255
Ex Post Facto Law . Similarly, H.R. 1029 could be subject to challenge as an
impermissible ex post facto law.256  Every law that makes criminal an act that was
innocent at the time it was committed, or that increases the punishment to a crime
already committed, is an ex post facto law prohibited by the Constitution.257  The
prohibition does not apply to laws of a non-criminal or non-punitive nature,258 but
cannot be evaded by clothing a punitive law in civil guise.259  If a U.S. person were
detained pursuant to the Detention of Enemy Combatants Act for past membership
in Al Qaeda, for example, or for cooperation with terrorists that took place prior to
the enactment of the Act, such detainee might challenge the Act as imposing new
burdens for past conduct, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution.  However, detention under the Act could continue only for so long as
“an investigation with a view toward prosecution, a prosecution, or a post-trial
proceeding” with respect to a particular detainee were ongoing, and only if the
President certifies that detention is warranted to prevent further acts of terrorism, in
which case detention could be permissible under ordinary penal statutes.  The legality
of the detention will likely depend on the extent to which the procedures put in place
by the executive satisfy the constitutional requirements for a temporary deprivation
of liberty.
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other victims of war).
264 See GPW, supra note 26.
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Due Process for Non-Resident Aliens.  H.R. 1029 does not apply to non-
resident aliens and other non-citizens not lawfully admitted for permanent residence
in the United States.  If H.R. 1029 is read to imply that non-resident aliens may be
detained as enemy combatants without any hearing at all, constitutional issues may
arise.  Aliens in the United States, whatever their immigration status, are “persons”
whose liberty interests are protected by the Fifth Amendment.260  While the standards
for administrative decisions relating to immigration status are not as extensive as due
process requirements for criminal procedures, other types of proceedings do not treat
aliens as having fewer rights under the Constitution.  Of course, the existence of a
state of war might work as an exception to this general rule.  During a declared war,
enemy aliens are by statute subject to detention and deportation based on their
nationality,261 in accordance with procedures set up by the executive branch.  The
Supreme Court validated such a program during World War II.262  It may thus be
permissible for Congress, in the exercise of its war powers, to enact specific
legislation defining who may be interned as an enemy based on factors other than
nationality, but it is not clear that the President has the authority to intern persons as
enemies without specific authorization from Congress.  If non-permanent resident
aliens are intended to be subject to detention as enemy combatants, it may be
advisable to include them under the same authority that applies to citizens and aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States.
International Legal Issues.  Because the detention of enemy combatants is
a means of conducting war, it is subject to the international law of war.263  H.R. 1029
would not authorize the detention of enemy combatants who are entitled to prisoner
of war status under the Third Geneva Convention,264 but it could be read to authorize
the detention of civilian persons protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention265 under
conditions that do not meet the requirements of that treaty.  It is not clear whether the
1949 Geneva Conventions apply in their entirety during the war against terrorism as
they would in the case of an international war, or whether the war should be
categorized as an “armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,” in which case only common article
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1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 (a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) Taking of hostages; 
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment; 
 (d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples. 
267 Israel’s targeted killings of terrorist leaders might serve as precedent for the targeting of
persons deemed to be enemy combatants, but the practice has generated controversy.  See
Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including
Palestine, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights 10-12,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/6 (2003); see also Emanuel Gross, Democracy in the War Against
Terrorism — the Israeli Experience, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2003)(noting that
preemptive killings of terrorists “are only permitted as a last resort where there is no
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3 of the Geneva Conventions would apply.266  H.R. 1029 may satisfy U.S. obligations
under common article 3.  
H.R. 1029 may come under criticism for failing to define “enemy combatant”
as that term is ordinarily understood in the context of the law of war.  As a general
rule, combatants are soldiers and others who engage in combat.  Combatants are
lawful military targets during combat operations, but the law of war prefers capture
and detention as a more humane alternative to killing or wounding them.  Aiders and
abettors of the enemy (and terrorists) traditionally have been treated as criminal
civilians rather than enemy combatants, and are not ordinarily treated as lawful
military targets except perhaps in the extreme circumstances where the use of deadly
force would be warranted against a person committing or about to commit a hostile
act.267  The use of the phrase “enemy combatant” to describe both battlefield
combatants and criminals arrested in areas where law and order appear to prevail
suggests that the use of military force is authorized as if a global battle were taking
place. 
Many foreign countries whose nationals are currently being held as enemy
combatants have objected to the disparity in treatment accorded to U.S. citizens held
as alleged terrorists and aliens in custody for similar conduct, who have been denied
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access to U.S. courts altogether.268  H.R. 1029 may be regarded abroad as increasing
the disparity of treatment, possibly heightening international criticism of the U.S.
government’s conduct of the war against terrorism.
Conclusion
The two “enemy combatant” cases currently making their way through the
federal courts may have an impact on the means used to prosecute the war on
terrorism.  The Attorney General has clarified that the detention of suspicious aliens,
and now some citizens as well, is one facet of the government’s strategy for
preventing future acts of terrorism.269  As a consequence, the extent to which the
Congress has authorized the detention without trial of American citizens as “enemy
combatants” may become an important issue in determining the validity of the
Administration’s tactics. While the broad language of the Authorization for the Use
of Force (“AUF”)270 authorizes the use of such military force as the President deems
appropriate in order to prevent future acts of terrorism, it is possible to argue that the
AUF was not intended to authorize the President to assert all of the war powers
usually reserved for formal declarations of war.271  
History shows that even during declared wars, additional statutory authority has
been seen as necessary to validate the detention of citizens not members of any armed
forces. Courts, however, have not explicitly ruled on the point with respect to
circumstances like these.  Congressional activity since the Quirin decision suggests
that Congress did not interpret Quirin as a significant departure from prior practice
with regard to restriction of civil liberties during war.  If that is the case, it may be
argued that Congress has shown the intent to authorize the capture and detention of
individuals like Hamdi — persons captured on the battlefield during actual hostilities
 — for so long as military operations remain necessary, while withholding the
authority to detain individuals like Padilla — an accused enemy agent operating
domestically — except in accordance with regular due process of law.  If Congress
were to pass the Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, or similar legislation, the
future detention of persons deemed to be enemy combatants would likely face fewer
hurdles in court.272  However, even with the express authorization of Congress,
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As this Court sits only a short distance from where the World Trade Center once
stood, we are as keenly aware as anyone of the threat al Qaeda poses to our
country and of the responsibilities the President and law enforcement officials
bear for protecting the nation. But presidential authority does not exist in a
vacuum, and this case involves not whether those responsibilities should be
aggressively pursued, but whether the President is obligated, in the circumstances
presented here, to share them with Congress.
constitutional due process issues seem likely to arise.  Again, the necessity of such
congressional authorization will be an issue likely to be revisited in the current cases.
